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ABSTRACT
This paper provides both a conceptual framework for decomposing a country’s gross exports into value-added
components by source and a new bilateral database on value-added trade. Our parsimonious framework
integrates all previous measures of vertical specialization and value-added trade in the literature. To
illustrate the potential of the decomposition, we present a number of applications including re-computing
revealed comparative advantages and constructing an index to describe whether a country-sector is
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As different stages of production are now regularly performed in different countries, 
intermediate inputs cross borders multiple times. As a result, traditional statistics on trade values 
become increasingly less reliable as a gauge of value contributed by any particular country. This 
paper integrates and generalizes the many attempts in the literature at tracing value added by 
country in international trade. We provide a conceptual framework that is more comprehensive 
than other measures in the literature. By design, this is an accounting exercise, and does not 
directly examine the causes and the consequences of global production chains. However, an 
accurate accounting of value added by source country is a necessary step toward a better 
understanding of all these issues.  
  Supply chains can be described as a system of value-added sources and destinations 
within a globally integrated production network. Within a supply chain, each producer purchases 
inputs and then adds value, which is included in the cost of the next stage of production. At each 
stage in the process, as goods cross an international border, the value-added trade flow is equal to 
the value added paid to the factors of production in the exporting country. However, as all 
official trade statistics are measured in gross terms, which include both intermediate inputs and 
final products, they “double count” the value of intermediate goods that cross international 
borders more than once. The conceptual and empirical shortcomings of gross trade statistics, as 
well as their inconsistency with the System of National Accounts (SNA) accounting standards, 
have been well recognized by the economics profession.
1 The framework developed in this paper 
provides a complete decomposition of gross exports into its value-added components, thus 
making it possible to connect trade statistics with SNA standards. 
Case studies of global value chains in industries such as electronics, apparel, and motor 
vehicles have provided detailed examples of the discrepancy between gross and value-added 
trade. According to a commonly cited study of the Apple iPod (Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden, 
2008), while the Chinese factory gate price of an assembled iPod is $144, only $4 constitutes 
Chinese value added. Other case studies of specific products show similar discrepancies. Case 
studies, while useful, do not offer a comprehensive description of an economy’s participation in 
cross-border production chains. Several researchers have examined the issue of vertical 
specialization on a systematic basis, including the pioneering effort of Hummels, Ishii, and Yi 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Leamer et al. (2006) and Grossman and Rossi-Hasberg (2008). 3 
 
(2001). Some measures, such as those proposed by HIY, turn out to be accurate only under 
special assumptions that do not hold in general. Others, to be reviewed in detail later, capture 
pieces of the value added embedded in a country’s exports. This paper aims to provide the first 
unified framework that integrates the older literature on vertical specialization with the newer 
literature on value added trade. It completely decomposes gross exports and connects official 
gross statistics to value-added measures of trade. The framework distributes all value-added in a 
country’s exports to its original sources, and it expresses individual sources and destinations of 
value added at either the country-wide or industry average level. Despite the breadth of the 
framework, it is also quite parsimonious, expressing major value-added sources in gross exports 
as the product of only three matrices. 
Several previous papers have investigated source of value-added in Asian supply chains 
using the Asian input-output (AIO) tables produced by the Institute of Development Economies 
in Japan. Such papers include Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2009), Pula and Peltonen (2011), 
Wang, Powers, and Wei (2009), and WTO and IDE-JETRO (2011). However, these studies’ 
reliance on the AIO tables precludes them from tracking value-added to and from countries 
outside of Asia, with the exception of flows to and from the United States. 
Truly global analyses have become possible only recently, with the advent of global 
Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) tables based on the GTAP database. Such tables provide 
globally consistent bilateral trade flows, and allow comparison of production networks in 
different regions. Though usefully global in scope, the GTAP database does not separate 
imported intermediate and final goods in bilateral trade flows, so improvement has to be made
2.  
This paper is also related to Daudin, Rifflart, and Schweisguth (2010) and Johnson and 
Noguera (2010). They analyze global value-added trade flows using an estimated ICIO table 
based on the GTAP database, in which they proportionally allocate gross trade flows into 
intermediate and final goods and distributing across users. Each shows that countries and sectors 
differ widely in their ratio of value added to gross trade. This paper expands upon their analysis 
in the following five aspects: 
                                                 
2 Efforts sponsored by European commission are underway to produce better and more up-to-date global ICIO 
tables, called the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), based on a compilation of single-country IO tables and 
detailed bilateral trade statistics for the years 1995-2006. Once the WIOD is completed, the framework in this paper 
can be applied to generate a time series decomposition of gross trade flows into their value added components. 4 
 
First, our unified and transparent framework incorporates all measures of vertical and 
value-added trade in the existing literature. For example, our framework decomposes a country’s 
exports into five broad value added components. Both HIY’s two original measures of vertical 
specialization and newer measures of value-added trade are components of our decomposition or 
their linear combinations. However, some measures have to be modified from their original 
definition in order to correctly specify sources of value added in a multi-country framework. 
Second, by completely decomposing each country's gross exports into value-added 
components, we can establish a formal and precise relationship between value-added measures 
of trade and official trade statistics. We clearly show the similarities and differences between 
value-added trade measures and domestic content measures for the first time in the literature. 
Value-added trade is the value generated by one country but absorbed by another country, while 
the domestic content of exports depends only on where value is produced, not where and how 
that value is used. 
Third, with the value added decomposition of gross exports, we can construct a 
quantitative index to assess whether a particular sector in a country is likely located in the 
upstream or downstream of the global production chain. 
Fourth, our estimated global ICIO table better captures the international source and use of 
intermediate goods than in previous databases in two ways. By estimating intermediate goods in 
bilateral trade using the end-use classification (intermediate or final) of detailed import statistics, 
rather than the conventional proportionality approach that assumes the same split of imports 
between intermediate usage and final demands as in total absorption, we generate a global ICIO 
table that is better than the previous databases.
3 In addition, we estimate separate input-output 
coefficients for processing trade in China and Mexico, the two major users of such regimes in the 
world.
4 While other studies have used a similar correction for Chinese exports, the new Mexican 
IO table provides improved accuracy in estimates of NAFTA trade flows by distinguishing 
domestic and Maquiladora production. 
                                                 
3 Feenstra and Jensen (2009) use a similar approach to separate final goods from intermediates in U.S. imports. They 
concord HS imports to end-use categories provided by the BEA. We concord HS imports to UN Broad Economic 
Categories, which are more applicable to international trade flows. 
4 Processing trade regimes can foster exports that have dramatically higher imported intermediate content than 
domestic use in some countries.  5 
 
Finally, we report a number of applications of our framework and database to illustrate 
their potential to reshape our understanding of global trade. For example, if one uses the official 
trade data to compute revealed comparative advantage, the business services sector is a 
comparative advantage sector for India. In contrast, if one uses value added in exports instead, 
the same sector becomes a revealed comparative disadvantage sector for India. As another 
example, the value added decomposition shows that a significant portion of China’s trade surplus 
to the United States in gross trade terms reflects indirect value added exports that China does on 
behalf of Japan, Korea and Taiwan. While such stories have been understood in qualitative 
terms, our framework offers to a way to quantify these effects.  
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework for 
decomposing gross trade into its value added components. Section 3 discusses computational 
issues. In particular, we show how the required inter-country IO model can be estimated from 
currently available data sources. Section 4 presents a number of applications that help to 
illustrate how the decomposition may alter our understanding of issues in international trade and 
in open-economy macroeconomics. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Decomposing Gross Trade into Value Added Components: Concepts and Measurement  
 
2.1 Concepts  
With modern international production chains, value added originates in many locations. 
While detailing these sources and measuring their contribution to exports are important for a 
number of research and policy questions, existing measures are unsatisfactory. As noted, HIY 
provided the first empirical measures of participation in vertically specialized trade. However, 
their measure of foreign value in exports is valid only in a special case; they did not 
mathematically define their measure of indirect value-added exports through third countries; and 
these two measures do not capture all sources of value added in gross exports. 
Two key assumptions are needed for the HIY’s measure to accurately reflect foreign 
contents in exports. First, all imported intermediate inputs must contain 100% foreign value 
added and no more than one country can export intermediates. In the HIY model, a country 
cannot import intermediate inputs, add value, and then export semi-finished good to another 
country to produce final goods. Nor can a country receive intermediate imports that embody its 6 
 
own value added, returned after processing abroad. Second, the intensity in the use of imported 
inputs is assumed to be the same whether goods are produced for export or for domestic final 
demand. This assumption is violated when processing exports raise the imported intermediate 
content of exports relative to domestic use, especially in China and Mexico. Therefore, HIY’s 
measures do not hold generally with the multi-country, back-and-forth nature of current global 
production networks.  
Section 2.2 illustrates how an ICIO model can allocate all the value added to each 
participating country using a block matrix formulation.This approach provides substantial clarity 
relative to other approaches in the literature, as we show below. To present the major concepts of 
our decomposition of gross exports by sources of value-added and show how they are related to 
or differ from earlier measuresin the literature, we start with a two-country case.  
 
2.2 Two-country case 
  Assume a two-country (home and foreign) world, in which each country produces goods 
in N differentiated tradable sectors. Goods in each sector can be consumed directly or used as 
intermediate inputs, and each country exports both intermediate and final goods to the other.  
All gross output produced by country r must be used as an intermediate good or a final 
good at home or abroad, or 
rs rr s rs r rr r Y Y X A X A X     ,  r,s  =   1 , 2        ( 1 )  
Where Xr is the N×1 gross output vector of country r, Yrs is the N×1 final demand vector that 
gives demand in country s for final goods produced in r, and Ars is the N×N IO coefficient matrix, 
giving intermediate use in s of goods produced in  r. The two-country production and trade 





































































































.      ( 3 )  
where Bsr denotes the N×N block Leontief inverse matrix, which is the total requirement matrix 
that gives the amount of gross output in producing country s required for a one-unit increase in 7 
 
final demand in country r. Yr is a 2N×1 vector that gives the global use of r’s final goods. This 
system can be expressed succinctly as: 
BY Y A I X   
1 ) ( ,            ( 4 )  
Where X and Y are 2N×1 vectors, and A and B are 2N×2N matrices. 
Having defined the Leontief inverse matrix, we turn to measures of domestic and foreign 
contents, first for production, and then applied to trade. Let Vs be the 1×N direct value-added 
coefficient vector. Each element of Vs gives the share of direct domestic value added in total 
output. This is equal to one minus the intermediate input share from all countries (including 
domestically produced intermediates):  
) (   
s sr r A I u V ,            ( 5 )  
where u is a 1×N unity vector. To be consistent with the multiple-country discussion below, we 














V .             ( 6 )  
While variations of this framework have been used in a number of recent studies, none 
uses the block matrix inverse as their mathematical tool and works out a complete tracing of all 
sources of value added. We turn to this task next. 
Combining these direct value-added shares with the Leontief inverse matrices produces 








22 2 21 2
12 1 11 1 VAS
B V B V
B V B V
VB .         ( 7 )  
Within VAS, each column of V1B11 denotes domestic value-added share of domestically 
produced products in a particular sector at home. Similarly, the columns of V2B21 denote the 
share of country 2’s value-added in these same goods. Each of the first N columns in the VAS 
matrix includes all value added, domestic and foreign, needed to produce one additional unit of 
domestic products at home. The second N columns present value-added shares for production in 
country  2. Because all value added must be either domestic or foreign, the sum along each 
column is unity: 
u B V B V B V B V     22 2 12 1 21 2 11 1 .          ( 8 )  8 
 
The VAS matrix contains all the needed information to separate domestic and imported 
content shares in each country's production and trade at the sector level. Either final goods 
exports or total exports could be used as weights to calculate these shares when aggregation is 
needed. To compare with other measures of vertical specialization in the literature and to link our 
measures with official trade statistics, we use gross exports.
5 Let Ers be the N×1 vector of gross 
exports from r to s. For consistency with the multi-country analysis below, we also define  
    




























E ,           ( 1 1 )  
Where E is a 2N×2 matrix and E ˆ  is a 2N×2N diagonal matrix. 
The combination of the value-added share matrix and an export matrix as weights 
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2 12 1 1 11 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ E ˆ VAS_
E B V E B V
E B V E B V
E VB ,         ( 1 2 )  
The elements of this matrix provide disaggregated value added by source in gross exports 
for each sector. It is important to note that this measure captures all upstream sectors’ 
contributions to value added in a specific sector’s exports. For example, in the electronics sector, 
E ˆ VAS_  includes value added in the electronics sector itself as well as value added in inputs 
from all other sectors (such as glass, rubber, transportation, and design) used to produce 
electronics for exports by the source country. Such an approach aligns well with case studies of 
supply chains of specific sectors and products, as in the iPod example cited earlier. As an 
alternative, one could measure the value added produced by the factors of production employed 
in a specific sector and then embodied in gross exports of all downstream sectors. This would 
include, for example, the value added by the electronics sector and then incorporated into gross 
                                                 
5The application to intermediates exports presents no problems here, because the content share in a product depends 
only on where it is produced. In other words, we maintain a basic assumption in the input-output literature that the 
value-added shares in intermediate goods are the same as in final goods within the same sector in each country. 
 9 
 
exports of computers, consumer appliances, and automobiles. This approach is closely related to 
the literature on factor contents of trade. 
  Domestic/foreign content of exports and value-added exports, while related, are different 
concepts. Although both concepts measure the value generated by factors employed in the 
producing country, domestic content of exports is independent of where that value is used. By 
contrast, value-added trade depends on how a country’s exports are used by importers. It is the 
value-added generated by a country but absorbed by another country. Therefore, equation (12) 
defines related measures of domestic/foreign contents in sector level gross exports, not sector 
level value-added exports. Because the later depends on where the value-added is absorbed, it 































V BY V        ( 1 3 )  
Where Ysr is an N by 1 vector and Y is 2N by 2 final demand matrix.  r V ˆ is a N by N diagonal 
matrix with direct value-added coefficients along the diagonal,has different dimension with V 
matrix defined earlier. The resulting 

VAT   is a 2N by 2 value-added production matrix, its 
diagonal elements give each country's production of value-added absorbed by itself while its off 
diagonal elements constitute the 2N by 2 bilateral value-added trade matrix. Because the value-
added trade matrix is the off-diagonal elements of 

VAT , it excludes value-added produced in 
the home country that returns home after processing abroad
6. 
To illustrate these two major concepts and their relations in the simplest possible terms, 
we will focus on the aggregate version throughout the rest of this section. The aggregate (2×2) 
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* 2 12 1 * 1 11 1 VAS_E
E B V E B V
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VBE .         ( 1 4 )  
Although rather elementary with only two countries, VAS_E expresses the major 
concepts of our new value-added by source measure. Diagonal elements of VAS_E define the 
                                                 
6Due to production sharing between home and foreign countries, it is possible for value added exports to be zero 
between two countries with positive gross exports. For example, if country 1’s exports to country 2 in car parts are 
all used as intermediaries in country’s 2’s car production that is entirely exported back to country 1. Of course, the 
reverse is also possible – two countries could have zero gross exports but positive value added exports. For example, 
country 2 could record zero gross exports of steel to country 1 but have positive value added exports in steel if its 
car exports to country 1 embed domestically produced steel. 10 
 
domestic value-added in each country’s exports. Off-diagonal elements give the foreign value-
added embodied in each country’s exports.  
In the two-country case, explicit solutions for the four Brs block matrices are not overly 
cumbersome, and allow us to demonstrate why HIY’s vertical specialization measures are a 
special case of our new general measures. Applying the algebra of the partitioned matrix 
inverse,
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Therefore, gross exports can be decomposed into foreign value-added (or VS, following 
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They are both 2×1matrices. 
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.           ( 1 8 )  
Comparing equations (17) and (18), we can see that the HIY measure only captures 
foreign value added in gross exports when either A12=0 or A21=0; i.e., in the case when only one 
country’s intermediate goods are used abroad. As Johnson and Noguera (2010) also point out, 
whenever both countries export intermediate products, the HIY measure diverges from the true 
measure of foreign value added in gross exports. Our new measure captures an important 
element omitted from the HIY’s formula. For the home country, both domestic and foreign value 
added differ from their true values by the term  21 21
1
22 12 ) ( E A A I A
  . Thus our new measure can 
account for a country importing its own value added which has been exported but return home 
after being processed abroad. In a more general context, VAS_E will properly attribute foreign 
and domestic contents to multiple countries when intermediate products cross borders in even 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Simon and Blume (1994, 182). 11 
 
more complicated patterns. This will become clearer when we extend the measure to three or 
more countries. 
The second HIY measure of vertical specialization (labeled as VS1 by HIY) details 
domestic value-added in inputs exported indirectly to third countries. Although an expression for 
such indirectly exported value-added (IV) has not been previously defined mathematically in the 
literature, it can be specified precisely in our framework. In a two-country world, the home 
country’s IV is identical to foreign country's FV: 
  21 12 1 1 IV E B V  .             ( 1 9 )  
This will not be true in the multi-country model that we turn to next.
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2.3 Three or more countries 
The analysis can be generalized to any arbitrary number of countries. Production, value-
added shares, and sources of value-added in gross exports are given succinctly by: 
BY Y A I X   
1 ) (  
VB VAS   
  VBE E VAS  _ .           ( 2 0 )  
With G countries and N sectors, X and Y are GN×1 vectors; A and B are GN×GN matrices; V and 
VAS are G×GN matrices; E is a GN×G matrix; and VAS_E is a G×G matrix. While we focus on 
the aggregate measures, all results continue to hold with full dimensionality and can be 
expressed simply by replacing the relevant weighting matrix. 
  In the multiple-country case, accurately calculating value added by source requires 
adjustments for intermediate inputs that cross multiple borders. Examining a three-country case 
in some details is useful for two reasons: (i) it exhibits nearly all the richness of the fully general 
multi-country analysis, and (ii) analytical solutions remain tractable and have intuitive 
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8 But, consistent with the many-country case, foreign value in direct exports will be measured along columns, while 
indirect value-added exports will be measured along rows. 
9 This expression is derived by iteratively applying the expression for the inverse of a partitioned matrix. (See 
appendix in Wang, Powers, and Wei (2009) for other analytical results. 12 
 
Comparing equation (21) with the equivalent term in equation (15), the three-country case 
contains more adjustments than the two-country case, all involving intermediate exports via third 
countries. Specifically, to measure domestic value-added share in country 1's total exports, the 
value-added embodied in its intermediate exports to country 2 and country 3 has to be accounted 
for. These intermediate goods could be used by the importing country (country 2 or country 3) to 
produce final goods and export back to the home country; or they could be used to produce 
intermediate goods exports to a third country (country 3 or country 2) that are then used to 
produce exports to the home country. Thus, adjustments have to be made for each of these 
intermediate flows.
10Similar adjustments are made to all measures of value-added by source to 
capture value added in production chains stretching across multiple borders.  
As before, the value-added shares can be applied to gross exports to produce VAS_E. 
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VBE E VAS .        ( 2 2 )  
  The distinction between value-added from direct and indirect sources in gross exports is 
much clearer with three countries than with two. The sum of off-diagonal elements along a 
column is the true measure of value-added from foreign sources embodied in a particular 





r sr s E B V * r FV .            ( 2 3 )  
The sum of off-diagonal elements along a row provides information on a country’s value-added 
embodied as intermediate inputs in third countries’ gross exports. This is the first explicit 





st rs r E B V r IV .            ( 2 4 )
11 
The diagonal terms measure domestic value added in gross exports:  
                                                 
10For example, 31
1
33 23 ) ( A A I A
  is the adjustment for country 2's exports of intermediate inputs to country 3 that 
are used to produce exports shipped to country 1, while  32
1
33 23 ) ( A A I A
  is the adjustment for country 2's exports 
of intermediate inputs to country 3 that are used to produce exports shipped back to country 2. 
11Domestic value-added returned home, labeled as VS1* in Daudin et al (2010), can be separated from IV, as 
sr rs r r E B V 
 VS1 . 13 
 
* r DV r rr r E B V  .           ( 2 5 )  
Equation (8) shows that columns of the VAS matrix sum to unity, so the sum of domestic and 
foreign value added must account for all gross exports, ensuring that value-added from all 
sources sum to official trade flows and this relation is true at both aggregate and sector level: 
* FV   DV r r r E   .            ( 2 6 )  
 
2.3 Extension to measures in the value-added trade literature 
Section 2.2 fully characterized value-added contributions from direct and indirect sources 
in a country' gross exports, formally generalizing the concept of vertical specialization to account 
for all sources of value-added in gross exports in a multi-country multi-sector framework. It also 
connects the vertical trade literature with value-added trade literature, generalizing concepts such 
as domestic value-added that returns home in goods and services after being processed or 
finished abroad, denoted VS1* by Daudinet al. (2010). This measure can be sizable for some 
large advanced economies. 
To do this, we first divide gross exports into final demand and intermediates. Within 
intermediates, we further divide those goods that are consumed by the direct importer from those 
goods that are processed and exported by the direct importer for consumption or further 
processing in a third country: 
           
r s s
sr rs s r t st rs ss rs rs s rs rs rs X A X A X A Y X A Y E
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exported   and   Processed
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        ,   (27) 
where Xst is the output of country s used to produce goods absorbed in country t. It is the product 
of the Leontief inverse matrix B and final demand matrix Y in equation (13). Note that the last 
three terms sum to the bilateral gross trade in intermediate goods, and all three terms may 
include both intermediates and final products produced in the importing country s.  
Combining equations (25) and (27), and summing over all trading partners as in equation 
(9), and inserting into equation (26), we arrive at our key decomposition equation that states that 
a country's gross exports to the world is the sum of the following five broad terms: 14 
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. (28) 
  (1) Domestic value-added embodied in exports of final goods and services absorbed by 
the direct importer; 
  (2) Domestic value-added embodied in exports of intermediate inputs used by the direct 
importer to produce its domestically needed products; 
  (3) Domestic value-added embodied in intermediate exports used by the direct importer 
to produce goods for third countries (“indirect value added exports’) 
  (4) Domestic value-added embodied in intermediate exports used by the direct importer 
to produce goods shipped back to source (“reflected domestic value added”) 
  (5) Value-added from foreign countries embodied in gross exports (“foreign value added 
used in exports”). 
  The decomposition formula is also diagrammed in Figure 1. Equation (28) (or Figure 1) 
integrates the older literature on vertical specialization with the newer literature on value added 
trade, while ensuring that measured value-added from all sources accounts for total gross 
exports. The vertical specialization literature emphasized that gross exports contain two sources 
of value added, domestic and foreign. Equation (28) shows that a country’s domestic value-
added could be further broken down into additional components that reveal the destination of a 
country’s exported value added, including its own value-added that returns home in its imports.
12 
The sum of (1), (2), and (3) equals each country's value-added exports to the world; the 
sum of (1),(2),(3), and (4) equals domestic content in a country's gross exports, thus nicely 
connecting the two major concepts in the vertical specialization and value-added trade literature 
on the one hand, and clearly distinguishing them on the other hand.  
  In addition, all other measures in the literature can be derived from a combination of the 
five basic measures. For instance, the sum of (3) and (4) equals HIY's VS1 in gross exports;the 
sum of (1),(2), and (3) divided by gross exports equals Johnson and Noguera's ratio of value-
                                                 
12 Since equation (27) decomposes all bilateral exports from country s to country r, it also simultaneously 
decomposes bilateral imports.  15 
 
added exports to gross exports (VAX ratio); and the sum of (4) and (5) equals the portion of 
trade that is “double counted”in official trade statistics.
13 
It is useful to note a caveat to the decomposition expressed in equation (28). In principle, 
imported intermediates (e.g., chemical) in one sector may be used to produce another 
intermediate (e.g., steel) that is used in the third sector at home (e.g., parts for chairs). That 
intermediate is then used to produce a product in the fourth sector that is eventually exported. In 
other words, the value added embedded in a given imported intermediate could travel through 
many sectors at home before it is exported. The expression in Equation (28) traces only the direct 
effect and the first round of the indirect effect. For this reason, it can be regarded as the first-
order approximation of the full order effect. The full order decomposition can be estimated  by 
using information on domestic final demand in the importing country to obtain domestic value 
added embodied in the intermediate goods used by direct importers to produce domestically 
needed final goods.
14  
In any case, the first order decomposition has the nice property that the sum of the five 
items in Equation (28) equals 100% of gross exports. This does not hold in general for the full 
order decomposition at the sector or bilateral level due to indirect value-added trade via 
intermediate goods.
15   For the full-order decomposition, however, the five value-added 
components account for 100% of the country’s gross exports only when trade values are summed 
over all sectors and all trading partners (to reach a country’s total exports to the world). In this 
case, the only difference with the first order decomposition is the distribution across components 
(2), (3) and (4), with a decrease in value-added absorbed by the direct importer (2) and an 
equivalent increase of indirect value-added absorbed by other countries ((3) and (4)).  The (full-
order) decomposition corresponding to Figure 1 using 2004 trade and production data is 
presented in Figure A1 in the online appendix.  
 
                                                 
13Component (3) should not be included in double counting, because when this value crosses a border for the second 
time, it becomes foreign value in the direct importer’s exports. For this reason, it is not included as double counting 
to avoid an over-correction. 
14 This provides a modification of item (2) in equation (28); Modified versions of items (3) and (4) then could be 
computed according to equation (24).  
15 Because value-added trade could diverge from gross trade significantly at the sector and bilateral level, the share 
of indirect value-added exports (returning home or via third countries) could go to infinity when there is large 
indirect value-added exports but near zero gross exports  16 
 
3. Data and results 
3.1 The construction of an Inter-Country Input-output (ICIO) table and its data sources 
To implement the above decomposition, we need an inter-country input output table, that 
is, a database detailing international production and use for all flows of value added. The 
database should specify (a) transactions of intermediate products and final goods within and 
between each country at the industry level, (b) the direct value-added in production of each 
industry in all countries, and (c) the gross output of each industry in all countries. Such an ICIO 
table goes beyond a collection of single-country IO tables.  It specifies the origin and destination 
of all transaction flows by industry as well as every intermediate and/or final use for all such 
flows. For example, an ICIO table would describe the number of electronics components 
produced in Japan that were shipped to China. It would also distinguish the number that were 
used as intermediate inputs in each Chinese sector and the number that were used in Chinese 
private household consumption and capital formation. However, these tables are not available on 
a global basis, and in fact are rarely available at the regional level. The available global 
databases, such as the GTAP Multi-Country Input-Output (MCIO) tables, do not have enough 
detail on the cross-border supply and use of goods to be directly used to implement our 
methodological framework.  
To provide a workable dataset and empirically conduct our gross export decomposition, 
we construct a global ICIO table for 2004 based on version 7 of the GTAP database as well as 
detailed trade data from UN COMTRADE, and two additional IO tables for major emerging 
economies where processing exports are a large portion of their external trade. We integrate the 
GTAP database and the additional information with a quadratic mathematical programming 
model that (a) minimizes the deviation of the resulting new data set from the original GTAP 
data, (b) ensures that supply and use balance for each sector and every country, and (c) keeps all 
sectoral bilateral trade flows in the GTAP database constant. The new database covers 26 
countries and 41 sectors and is used as the major data source of this paper.
16  ICIO tables specify 
country r’s use in sector i of imports from sector j from source country s. To estimate these 
detailed inter-industry and inter-country intermediate flows, we need to (i) distinguish 
intermediate and final use of imports from different sources in each sector, and (ii) allocate 
intermediate goods from a particular country source to each sector it is used within all 
                                                 
16 See Appendix table A2 for countries included in each region and their concordance to GTAP regions. 17 
 
destination countries. We address the first task by concording detailed trade data to end-use 
categories (final and intermediate) using UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC), as described 
below. No additional information is available to properly allocate intermediates of a particular 
sector from a specific source country to its use industries at the destination economy, however. 
Thus, sector j’s imported intermediate inputs of a particular product are initially allocated to each 
source country by assuming they are consistent with the aggregate source structure of that 
particular product.
17 
Although the GTAP database provides bilateral trade flows, it does not distinguish 
whether goods are used as intermediates or final goods. Our initial allocation of bilateral trade 
flows into intermediate and final uses is based on the UN BEC applied to detailed trade statistics 
at the 6-digit HS level from COMTRADE
18. This differs from the approaches in Johnson and 
Noguera (2010) and Daudin, Rifflart, and Schweisguth (2010), which also transform the MCIO 
table in the GTAP database into an ICIO table. However, they do not use detailed trade data to 
identify intermediate goods in each bilateral trade flow. Instead, they apply a proportionality 
method directly to the GTAP trade data; i.e., they assume that the proportion of intermediate to 
final goods is the same for domestic supply and imported products. 
The use of end-use categories to distinguish imports by use is becoming more widespread 
in the literature and avoids some noted deficiencies of the proportionality method.
19 Feenstra and 
Jensen (2009) use a similar approach to separate final goods from intermediates in U.S. imports 
in their recent re-estimation of the Feenstra-Hanson measure of material offshoring. Dean, Fung, 
and Wang (2009) show that the proportionality assumption underestimates the share of imported 
goods used as intermediate inputs in China’s processing trade. Nordas (2005) states that the large 
industrial countries have a higher share of intermediates in their exports than in their imports, 
while the opposite is true for large developing countries. These results imply that the 
                                                 
17 For example, if 20% of U.S. imported intermediate steel comes from China, then we assume that each U.S. 
industry obtains 20% of its imported steel from China. Such an assumption ignores the heterogeneity of imported 
steel in different sectors. It is possible that 50% of the imported steel used by the U.S. construction industry may 
come from China, while only 5% of the imported steel used by auto makers may be Chinese.  
18 Both the zero/one and a weighting scheme can be used with BEC, We used a zero/one classification. Shares based 
on additional information could be applied to dual use products to further improve the allocation. These are areas for 
future research. 
19 The literature notes that the UN BEC classification has shortcomings of its own however, particularly its inability 
to properly identify dual-use products such as fuels, automobiles, and some food and agricultural products. 18 
 
intermediate content of imports differs systematically from the intermediate content in domestic 
supply.  
The less distorted intermediate share estimates provides a better row total control for each 
block matrix of  sr A  in the ICIO coefficient matrix A, thus improving the accuracy of the most 
important parameters (the IO coefficients) in an ICIO model. However, it still does not properly 
allocate particular intermediate goods imported from a specific source country to each using 
industry (the coefficients in each cell of a particular row in each block matrix sr A  still have to be 
estimated by proportionality assumption). This allocation is especially important to precisely 
estimate value-added by sources for a particular industry, although it is less critical for the 
country aggregates because total imports of intermediates from a particular source country are 
fixed by observed data, so misallocations will likely cancel out. 
    To provide an accurate comparison of the UN BEC method versus the proportionality 
approach, we would need true inter-country IO coefficients as a reference, which unfortunately 
do not exist on a global scale. The only available reference is an ICIO table for nine East-Asian 
countries and the United States constructed by the Institute of Development Economics in Japan in 
cooperation with National Statistical agencies in related countries based in part on a survey of 
firms. The allocation of imports between intermediates and final demand in the pre-release version 
of the 2005 Asian Input-Output (AIO) table provides a reference point for comparison with our 
results, although it may also be considered as just another more extensive estimate. In Table 1, for 
electronic machinery imports, we list the share of intermediate inputs in imports from 12 countries 
and the world by the United States and Japan in three ways: (a) what is assumed by the 
proportionality assumption, (b) what is implied by the BEC classification, both from our 2004 
global ICIO table,  and (c) what is reported  in the 2005 AIO table. 
  The information on imports by the United States is listed in Columns 1-4. Under the 
proportionality assumption, the share of import across all exporting countries that are used as 
intermediates is a constant (54.2%) as reported in Column 1. By definition, its correlation with the 
shares in the AIO column is zero. Under BEC, the share varies by source countries (Column 2). 
The correlation between the share under BEC and the share from AIO is 0.98.  
  Similarly, we list the shares that go into intermediates for Japan’s imports of electronic 
machinery. Again, the correlation between the share under the proportionality assumption and the 
reference value is zero. In comparison, the correlation between the share under BEC and the 19 
 
reference value is 0.64. These examples illustrate possible improvement of using the BEC 
classification over the proportionality assumption
20. 
 
3.2 Complete decomposition of gross exports 
  Table 2 presents a complete decomposition of each country’s gross exports to the world 
in 2004 using the five basic value-added components specified in equation (28). The column 
number in the first five columns corresponds to both the item number in Equation (28) and the 
box number in Figure 1. 
Although these elements have been independently computed based on different elements 
in the VAS_E matrix and equation (28), they sum to exactly 100 percent of gross exports, thus 
verifying that the decomposition is complete. This is the first such decomposition in a global 
setting. It provides a more detailed break out of domestic value-added in exports than has been 
previously available in the literature and shows that there are large difference in value-added 
components across countries, indicating substantial differences in the role that countries play in 
global production networks.  
For example, for the United States, the share of foreign value added in its exports is 
12.9%, indicating that most of its exports reflect its own domestic value added. In comparison, 
for China’s processing exports, the share of foreign value added is 56.6%, indicating China’s 
domestic value added accounts for less than half the value of its processing exports. Appendix B 
provides additional detail on value-chain participation by different global regions. 
The right-hand panel of table 2 presents related measures (or their properly-measured 
analogues) from the literature derived from the five basic value-added measures.To reiterate the 
connection of these five basic components to measures in the existing literature: column (7) 
reports the ratio of value-added exports to gross exports (VAX ratio) proposed by Johnson and 
Noguera (2010) by adding columns (1), (2), and (3); column (8) reports share of VS1 proposed 
by HIY by adding columns (3) and (4); column (9) lists the share of domestic contents 
extensively discussed in the vertical specialization literature by summing columns (1), (2), (3) 
                                                 
20 Appendix Table A1 compares the average splits between intermediates and the final consumption between the 
two approaches in the aggregate. 20 
 
and (4); Column (11) gives the share of vertical trade by adding columns (5)
21 and (8), which is 
an indicator of how intensively a country participant in global production chain.  
Column (10) reports the percentage of multiple counting in official trade statistics by 
adding columns (4) and (5). At the global level, only domestic value added in exports absorbed 
abroad are value-added exports; value added embodied in imported intermediates are other 
country’s domestic value-added, and so cannot count as additional value-added for the importing 
country. In addition to foreign value added in exports, domestic value-added that returns home 
from abroad is also a part of double counting in official trade statistics, since it crosses borders at 
least twice. Such reflected value added has to be separated from domestic value-added absorbed 
abroad in order to fully capture multiple counting in official trade statistics. Therefore, for any 
country’s gross exports, the double counting portion equals the share of gross exports greater 
than the value-added exports between countries. It is the foreign value-added portion plus the 
portion of domestic value-added that returns home. This share is about 25.6% for total world 
exports in 2004 based on our ICIO database. 
Similar decompositions can be performed at the country-sector level. In Table A5, we 
report the decomposition results for ten largest exporters (based on the value of gross exports) in 
each of the 19 manufacturing sectors in our database. The sector-level results are subject to the 
limitations discussed previously, since the inaccuracy of cross-country intermediate-use 
coefficients could introduce unknown noise into both the sources of value-added I gross exports 
and value-added trade estimates at the industry level. 
 
3.3 Position of countries within global value chains: Evidence from sector-level decompositions 
   By using the decomposition results at the country-sector level, we can construct an index 
that helps us to gauge whether a country is likely to be in the upstream or downstream of the 
global value chain (GVC) in any particular sector. We can also construct a separate index that 
helps us to gauge the extent to which a country-sector is involved in the global production chain. 
For an index to capture a country’s position (i.e., upstream or downstream), it makes 
sense to compare that country’s exports of intermediates in that sector that are used by other 
countries, with that country’s use of imported intermediates in the same sector. If a country lies 
upstream in the global value-chain, it participates by producing  inputs for others, either by 
                                                 
21Column (5) corresponds to the VS share in HIY(2001). 21 
 
providing raw materials (such as Russia), or by providing manufactured intermediates (such as 
Japan), or both. For such a country, its indirect value added exports (IV) share in gross exports 
will be higher than its FV share. In comparison, if a country lies downstream in the global value 
chain, it will use a large portion of other countries intermediates to produce final goods for 
exports, and its FV share will be higher than its IV share. 
We define a country-sector level index for the position in the global value chain as the 
log ratio of a country-sector’s supply of intermediates used in other countries’ exports to the use 
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If the country-sector lies upstream in a supply chain, the numerator tends to be large. On the 
other hand, if it lies downstream, then the denominator tends to be large. For example, in the 
home electronics sector, if Japan specializes in providing components to assembly firms in 
China, the index tends to take on a high value for Japan and a low value for China. 
  Of course, two countries can have identical values of the GVC position index in a given 
sector while having very different degrees of participation in GVCs. Therefore, the position 
index has to be used in conjunction with another index that summarizes the importance of the 
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  We compute these two indices for all countries and sectors. We organize the information 
by sectors and present some of them in Figure 2.
 For example, the upper left graph of Figure 2 
describes the electronic equipment sector. Numbers in the parentheses are 2 digit ISIC codes.  
Japan, Mexico “normal” (i.e., non-processing exports), Western Europe (WEU)
22 and the United 
States are the most upstream countries in the electronics value chain (given on the left axis), 
indicating that they are the main suppliers of components to firms in the same industry in other 
countries. In comparison, Singapore, China processing exports, new EU member countries 
                                                 
22 The original 15 EU members are referred to here as “Western EU”, while the next 12 members to accede are 
referred to as “Eastern EU” or “new EU members”. 22 
 
(EEU), Indonesia, and Thailand are at the most downstream end of the value chain, indicating 
that their exports mostly use imported components for production. To see why it is important to 
look at the participation index (right vertical axis) together with the position index (left vertical 
axis), we take another look at Japan and Mexico normal. While they both occupy upstream 
positions in the value chain, Japan has a high participation value, but Mexico normal has a 
relatively trivial value for the participation index. Being a part of global production chain is a far 
more important feature for the electronic equipment sector in Japan than for the same sector in 
Mexico normal. 
  In the upper right graph of Figure 2, we present the position and participation indexes for 
the finished metal products sector. While Mexico, Japan, the United States and Mexico normal 
are the most upstream based on the position index, participation in the GVC is only substantial 
for the United States and Japan accordingto the participation index. At the other extreme, China 
processing, Mexico processing, and Singapore
23  have the most downstream locations. The 
participation index for them (all in excess of 70%) indicates that assembly using primarily 
imported inputs is the main feature of their exports in this sector. 
  The graphs for other sectors can be read similarly, which we will not go into detail to 
save space. We would note a few broad patterns. First, the importance of separating processing 
and normal exports for China and Mexico is clear. While their processing exports tend to be 
heavy users of imported inputs, whereas their normal exports often supply intermediates to other 
countries’ exports. Second, the original EU member countries and new accession countries also 
tend to lie on the two ends of the global production chain. For example, in electronic equipment, 
ferrous metal, and papers and publishing, Western EU countries tend to lie upstream, whereas 
Central and Eastern EU countries tend to be more downstream in the value chains. 
We want to end this subsection with a note of caution in using sector-level 
decompositions. As we discussed earlier, the lack of information in our current database on how 
imported inputs are distributed among sector users within each country may introduce unknown 
noise into both sources of value-added in gross exports and value-added trade estimates at sector 
                                                 
23 For Singapore, because the GTAP database does not take out transshipment trade and re-exports as it did for Hong 
Kong, the position index may exaggerate the extent to which Singapore is at the downstream of the production 
chain. 23 
 
level. If we focus on country rankings rather than the exact numerical numbers, the impact of the 
errors is likely to be smaller. 
. 
4. Broad implications for a better understanding of global trade 
  The decomposition results have implications for a variety of research and policy 
questions. In this section, to illustrate the potential importance of the decomposition, we brief 
discuss a few applications.   
 
4.1 Revealed Comparative Advantage index based on gross and value-added trade 
  The concept of revealed comparative advantage (RCA for short), proposed by Balassa 
(1965), has proven to be useful in many research and policy applications. In standard 
applications, it is defined as the share of a sector in a country’s total gross exports relative to the 
world average of the same sector in world exports. When the RCA exceeds one, the country is 
said to have a revealed comparative advantage in that sector; when the RCA is below one, the 
country is said to have a revealed comparative disadvantage in that sector. The problem of 
multiple counting of certain value added components in the official trade statistics suggests that 
the traditional computation of RCA could be noisy and misleading. Our value added 
decomposition of exports provides a way to remove the distortion of multiple counting by 
focusing on domestic value added in exports. 
  We re-compute the RCA index at the country-sector level for all the countries and sectors 
in our database. Due to space constraints, we select two sectors and compare the country 
rankings of RCAs using both gross exports and domestic value added in gross exports. In Figure 
3, we report the two sets of RCA indices for the finished metal products sector. Using gross 
exports data, both China and India show a strong revealed comparative advantage (ranked the 
first and fourth, respectively, among the set of countries in our database, and with the absolute 
values of RCA at 1.94 and 1.29, respectively). However, when looking at domestic value added 




24 In fact, for India, the sector has switched from being labeled as a comparative 
                                                 
24 Sectoral value added here includes value produced by the factors of production employed in the finished metal 
products sector and then embodied in gross exports of all downstream sectors, rather than the value added employed 
in upstream sectors that are used to produce finished metal products in the exporting country. This distinction is 
particularly important in the business services sector, discussed next. 24 
 
advantage sector to a comparative disadvantage sector. Unsurprisingly, the ranking for some 
other countries moves up. For example, for the United States, not only its RCA ranking moves 
up from 10
th place under the conventional calculation to the 3
rd place under the new calculation, 
finished metal products industry also switches from being labeled as a comparative disadvantage 
sector to a comparative advantage sector. 
  Another example is the “real estate and business services” sector. Using data on gross 
exports, India exhibits a strong revealed comparative advantage in that sector on the strength of 
its unusually high share of business services exports in its overall exports. However, once we 
compute RCA using domestic value added in exports, the same sector becomes a comparative 
disadvantage sector for India! One key reason for the change is that business services in 
advanced countries are often exported indirectly by being embedded in these countries 
manufacturing exports. Indeed, the RCA rankings for this sector in the United States, the 
European Union and Japan all move up using data on the domestic value added in exports. 
Therefore, compared to the share of this sector in other countries’ exports (after taking into 
account indirect value added exports), the Indian share of the sector in its exports becomes much 
less impressive. 
  These examples illustrate the possibility that our understanding of trade patterns and 
revealed comparative advantage could be modified substantially once we have the right data on 
domestic value added in exports. 
 
4.2 Magnification of trade costs from multi-stage production 
As noted by Yi (2003, 2010), multi-stage production magnifies the effects of trade costs 
on world trade. There are two separate magnification forces. The first exists because goods that 
cross national barriers multiple times incur tariffs and transportation costs multiple times. The 
second exists because tariffs are applied to gross imports, even though value added by the direct 
exporter may be only a fraction of this amount. Different participation in global networks affects 
the extent to which different countries are affected by such cost magnification. However, Yi 
(2003) does not actually measure the magnification of tariffs, though it is important to his 
simulations exercise.  
Our value added estimates provide an ideal way to re-examine the magnification issue. In 
Table 3, we first report standard trade costs applied to exports of final goods in columns (1)–(3).  25 
 
These include the trade-weighted average transportation margin (ad valorem cif-fob margin), the 
trade-weighted tariff rate applied abroad (ad-valorem equivalent), and the total of these two trade 
costs. Column (4) reports the share of foreign value added in final manufacture goods exports, 
including domestic value that returns to the source country.
25 These imported intermediate inputs 
are used to produce final manufacture goods exports, and so incur multiple tariffs and 
transportation costs. The foreign content shares are combined with tariff rates and transportation 
margins applicable to each country’s own imports to calculate the trade costs that accompany use 
of imported intermediate inputs in producing exports.These trade costs (as a share of f.o.b. export 
value) are presented in columns (5)–(7). Specifically, these three columns report the trade-
weighted average costs for intermediate inputs from the other 25 countries/regions in our 
database that are used in the exporting country to produce final manufacture goods exports.  
The next three columns report our illustrative calculation of the first order magnification 
effect of using imported intermediate inputs to produce exports. Column (8) represents the 
magnification effect if transport costs were the only factor that augments the trading costs; 
Column (9) represents the magnification effect if tariffs were the only factor that augments the 
trading costs. Finally, Column (10) is the magnification effect when both transport costs and 
tariffs are taken into account. For instance, one additional stage of production increase trade 
costs in Vietnam’s manufacturing sector by 91% of its standard cost.  
Although the number is already quite high for a number of countries
26, these values still 
represent only the lower bound of the true multi-stage trade costs, because these inputs may have 
already crossed multiple borders before reaching the final exporter. 
Emerging Asia has some of the highest magnification ratios because their manufacturing 
industries are involved in longer supply chain, use more imported inputs, in some cases (such as 
Vietnam and Thailand) impose high tariffs on their intermediate imports. The effects of these 
barriers on the magnification ratio are tempered somewhat by the high standard trade cost these 
countries face on their exports because of longer distance transportation to final destination of 
their exports than other emerging economies. China is notable for having the lowest trade costs 
on imports in the region, and hence the lowest magnification factor in the region, since it applies 
very low tariffs on its imported intermediate to produce its exports (about half of its exports are 
                                                 
25 In practice, each country’s vector of foreign value shares for all products is used  in the calculation. 
26 Table A6 in the online appendix reports descriptive statistics for the 16 manufacturing sectors included in table 3, 
such as the range and standard deviation of the sector-level results. 26 
 
processing trade with no tariff charged on intermediate imports). Relative to Asia, other 
emerging countries in our dataset typically involve shorter supply chains, use less imported 
inputs and apply lower tariffs to their own intermediate imports, and hence have lower ratios.
27  
Developed economies tend to have low magnification ratios due to two reasons. First, 
they apply relatively low tariffs to their intermediate imports. Second, the share of foreign value 
added in their exports tends to be low.    
The second magnification force occurs because tariffs are applied to gross export value 
instead of the value added in the direct exporting country. Table 3 also reports the magnification 
ratio of the “effective” tariff rate to the standard tariff rate.  Column (11) reports the effective 
tariff rate, which equals the standard tariff rate in column (2) plus the tariff applied by the 
producing country to its intermediate goods imports in column (6), divided by the domestic 
content share (which is 100 minus column (4)).  Column (12) reports the implied magnification 
ratio due to the presence of vertical specialization. These effects are generally larger than the 
tariff magnification factor reported in column (9).   
Generally speaking, tariffs play a greater role than transportation costs in the 
magnification of trade costs in the presence of GVCs for emerging market economies, while the 
opposite is true for most developed countries.  The fact that the domestic value-added share in 
emerging economies’ manufacturing exports is usually lower than that in developed countries 
tends to amplify the effective trade cost for developing countries. Reducing tariffs and nontariff 
barriers in manufacturing sectors globally is fully consistent with the interest of emerging market 
economies by lowering the cost for developing countries' participation in GVCs. Lowering 
“own” tariffs on intermediate inputs for domestic manufacturing production would significantly 
reduce the magnification effects as demonstrated in column (9), while lowering such tariffs in 
other countries would significantly reduce the effective rate of protection, as seen in columns 
(11) and (12), due to the lower domestic value-added share in most developing countries’ 
manufacturing exports. 
 
                                                 
27 Mexican processing exports is an unusual case. Although trade costs on imports are relatively low, the 
magnification ratio is quite high, because the standard trade costs are low (1.5%) and the foreign content share in 
exports is substantial (63.5%). 27 
 
4.3 Bilateral trade imbalance 
 
   Because a country’s gross exports embeds value added from other countries, bilateral 
trade balance in value added terms can be very different from bilateral balance in gross trade 
terms. This point is already well understood qualitatively. The decomposition results in this 
paper allow us to quantify the difference. 
Figure 4 provides a scatter plot of the trade balance in value added terms against the trade 
balance in standard trade statistics for all bilateral country pairs in our ICIO database. Without 
loss of generality, the two countries in any pair are always ordered in such a way that the trade 
balance in gross term is non-negative. A negative value-added to gross BOT ratio indicates there 
is a sign change between BOT measured in gross and value-added terms. All observations that 
lie below the 45 degree line have their bilateral trade imbalance smaller in value-added terms 
than that in gross terms, and vice visa for observations that lie above the 45 degree line. 
Value-added flows give a much different picture of the contributions of China and Japan 
to the U.S. and Western EU countries’ trade deficits. Because China is the final assembler in a 
large number of global supply chains, and it uses components from many other countries, 
especially East Asian countries, its trade surplus with US and Western EU countries measured in 
value-added term is 41% and 49% less than that measured in gross terms.  In contrast, Japan's 
trade surplus with the U.S. and Western EU countries are 40% and 31% larger measured in 
value-added terms, because Japan exports parts and components to countries throughout Asia 
that are eventually assembled into final products and exported to the United States and Western 
EU countries.
28Zooming in near the origin shows that the trade balances of a number of country 
pairs even have opposite signs measured in value-added and gross terms. For example, Japan’s 
trade balance vis-à-vis China is switched from a surplus in gross trade terms to a deficit in value 
added terms. This is consistent with the notion that a significant part of Japan’s exports to China 
are components used by China-based firms for exports to the United States, the European Union 
and other markets. This further illustrates potentially misleading nature of gross bilateral trade 
imbalance. 
 
                                                 
28Figure 4 also shows that the Korea-China-U.S. triple trade relationship is similar to the Japan-China-U.S. one. 28 
 
4.4 Other applications 
The set of examples discussed so far certainly does not exhaust the possible applications. 
For example, the Federal Reserve Board and the IMF routinely compute effective exchange rates 
using trade weights that are based on gross exports and imports. A conceptually better measure 
should weight trading partners based on the relative importance in value added trade rather than 
in gross trade terms. Our decomposition results make it feasible to do such computations. 
  As another example, for some research or policy questions, one might need to look at the 
response of a country’s bilateral or multilateral trade to exchange rate changes. Once one 
recognizes that there is a potential mismatch between trade in value added and trade in gross 
terms, one would want to take this into account. Our decomposition allows for a correction. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have developed a unified measure for sources of value-added in gross exports with a 
transparent conceptual framework based on the block-matrix structure of an inter-country IO 
model. This new framework incorporates all previous measures of vertical specialization and 
value-added trade in the literature while adjusting for the back-and-forth trade of intermediates 
across multiple borders. With a full concordance between value-added components and official 
gross trade statistics, it opens the possibility for the System of National Accounts (SNA) to 
accept the concept of value-added trade without dramatically changing current customs trade 
data collection practice. This may in turn provide a feasible way for international statistical 
agencies to report value-added trade statistics regularly in a relatively low cost fashion. 
The contributions of this paper lie largely in its comprehensive framework, its approach 
to database development, and the new detailed decomposition of domestic value-added that has 
revealed about each country’s role in global value chains at industry average level. To improve 
the sector level results, current end use classifications, such as the UN BEC, need to be extended 
to dual use products and services trade. In addition, methods need to be developed to properly 
distribute imports to domestic users either based on cross country statistical surveys of the 
domestic distribution of imports or based on firm level and Customs transaction-level trade data. 
 The creation of a database that encompasses detailed global trade in both gross and 
value-added terms, however, will allow us to move from a largely descriptive empirical exercise 
to analysis of the causes and consequences of differences in supply chain participation. We have 29 
 
discussed the use of the decomposition results to re-compute revealed comparative advantages 
and bilateral trade balance. Surely there are other applications that may affect our understanding 
of trade and other issues. We leave other applications to future research.  
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Table 1 Share of intermediate inputs in electronic machinery imports, 2004 
 
Country 
United States    Japan 
Value
a 
Share of intermediate inputs(%) 
Value
a












c Asia  IO 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EU  13,405 54.2 65.0 58.3  2,551 46.2 47.8 53.5 
Japan  23,364  54.2  57.5  51.9             
United States              7,165 46.2 67.6 62.4 
Hong  Kong  348 54.2 41.4  43  112 46.2 48.1 44.2 
Korea  18,718 54.2 42.4 43.2  6,244 46.2 75.0 66.6 
Taiwan  13,175 54.2 62.4 57.5  8,423 46.2 77.9 72.1 
Singapore  7,678 54.2 52.5 46.0  112 46.2 48.1 43.5 
China  57,357 54.2 33.5 36.6  20,088 46.2 13.0 30.8 
Indonesia  1,765 54.2 34.9 37.2  1,074 46.2 33.3 46.5 
Malaysia  21,035 54.2 49.2 46.6  5,638 46.2 59.6 45.1 
Philippines  3,245 54.2 82.2 71.0  4,999 46.2 73.0 60.8 
Thailand  4,787 54.2 30.4 39.5  3,901 46.2 60.0 38.9 
India  145 54.2 86.2 65.9  7 46.2 50.8 60.8 
World Total  201,526 54.2 47.1 45.9  65,563 46.2 51.5 47.9 
Correlation with AIO
b  N=13 0.00 0.98 1.00  N=13 0.00 0.64 1.00 
 
Source: Authors estimate based on domestic supply in GTAP database and UNBEC. 
aImports of both intermediate and final goods, in millions of U.S. dollars. 32 
 
Table 2 Decomposition of gross exports, 2004 
Country or region 








































  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Advanced economies                               
Australia, New 
Zealand 
27.0 33.6  27.4  0.6  11.5  100  88.0  27.9 88.5  12.0 39.4 
Canada   23.5 36.2  10.9  1.3  28.1  100  70.5  12.2 71.9  29.5 40.4 
EFTA  23.0 36.3  14.7  0.8  25.2  100  74.0  15.5 74.8  26.0 40.8 
Western EU  38.1 29.6  13.5  7.4  11.4  100  81.1  20.9 88.6  18.9 32.3 
Japan   38.4 18.5  28.0  2.9  12.2  100  84.9  30.8 87.8  15.1 43.1 
United States   32.5 27.6  14.6  12.4  12.9  100  74.6  27.0 87.1  25.4 39.9 
Asian NICs                
Hong Kong   27.2 25.8  18.9  0.6  27.5  100  71.9  19.5 72.5  28.1 47.0 
Korea   29.5 13.5  22.3  0.9  33.9  100  65.2  23.2 66.1  34.8 57.0 
Taiwan   19.2 12.6  26.4  0.8  41.1  100  58.2  27.1 58.9  41.8 68.2 
Singapore  11.0 13.1  12.2  0.6  63.2  100  36.3  12.8 36.8  63.7 76.0 
Emerging Asia                      
China Normal  44.2 20.3  19.7  1.2  14.6  100  84.2  20.9 85.4  15.8 35.5 
China Processing  28.8 10.2  4.1  0.3  56.6  100  43.1  4.4 43.4  56.9 61.0 
Indonesia   20.0 28.1  28.4  0.6  22.9  100  76.5  29.0 77.1  23.5 51.9 
Malaysia   16.7 17.7  24.1  0.9  40.5  100  58.6  25.0 59.5  41.4 65.5 
Philippines   17.6 11.1  29.0  0.4  41.9  100  57.8  29.4 58.1  42.2 71.2 
Thailand   27.9 14.0  18.1  0.3  39.7  100  60.0  18.5 60.3  40.0 58.1 
Vietnam   32.9 15.3  14.4  0.4  37.0  100  62.6  14.8 63.0  37.4 51.8 
Rest of East Asia  35.3 26.9  16.1  0.1  21.7  100  78.2  16.2 78.3  21.8 37.9 
India   30.2 30.8  18.6  0.4  20.1  100  79.6  18.9 79.9  20.4 39.0 
Rest of South Asia   48.8 19.2  10.6  0.1  21.3  100  78.6  10.7 78.7  21.4 32.0 
Other emerging                       
Brazil   27.4 40.7  19.0  0.3  12.7  100  87.0  19.2 87.3  13.0 31.9 
EU accession 
countries 
28.7 29.2  10.4  1.0  30.8  100  68.3  11.4 69.2  31.7 42.1 
Mexico Normal  23.5 41.1  17.4  0.6  17.3  100  82.1  18.1 82.7  17.9 35.3 
Mexico Processing  20.6 10.1  5.6  0.3  63.4  100  36.3  5.9 36.7  63.7 69.3 
Rest of Americas  23.8 40.6  20.4  0.7  14.4  100  84.9  21.2 85.6  15.2 35.6 
Russian Federation   9.5 49.1  30.5  0.7  10.2  100  89.1  31.2 89.8  10.9 41.4 
South Africa   23.1 34.5  24.0  0.2  18.2  100  81.6  24.2 81.8  18.4 42.4 
Rest of the world  15.0 45.6  22.4  2.5  14.6  100  83.0  24.9 85.4  17.0 39.5 





















ratio   Trans‐  Tariff  Total  Trans‐  Tariff  Total  Trans‐  Tariff  Total 
port   Port   port 
   (1)  (2)  (3)= 
(1)+(2) 
(4)  (5)  (6)  (7)= 
(5)+(6) 
(8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)= 
(11)/(2) 
Advanced economies    
Aus‐New Zealand  3.7  4.4  8.1  21.4  1.0  0.9  1.8  1.1 1.1 1.2  7.0  1.6 
Canada   1.3  0.5  1.8  41.7  0.8  0.3  1.1  1.4 1.2 1.6  2.8  5.7 
EFTA  2.0  2.0  3.9  37.1  0.8  0.1  0.8  1.2 1.0 1.2  4.8  2.4 
WEU  3.4  4.6  7.9  12.4  0.4  0.2  0.6  1.1 1.0 1.1  6.4  1.4 
Japan   3.2  5.4  8.6  11.6  0.3  0.0  0.4  1.0 1.0 1.0  7.2  1.3 
USA  2.4  2.4  4.8  14.3  0.4  0.1  0.6  1.1 1.0 1.1  4.0  1.7 
Asian NICs    
Hong Kong  4.4  8.5  12.9  41.6  1.8  0.0  1.8  1.1 1.0 1.1  16.3  1.9 
Korea  3.3  5.0  8.2  31.5  0.8  1.3  2.1  1.1 1.2 1.3  9.0  1.8 
Taiwan  4.0  3.3  7.3  41.6  1.3  1.6  2.8  1.2 1.2 1.4  7.7  2.3 
Singapore  2.9  2.1  5.0  70.5  1.8  0.0  1.8  1.4 1.0 1.4  10.5  5.0 
Emerging Asia    
China normal  7.3  9.2  16.5  13.7  0.7  1.4  2.1  1.0 1.1 1.1  11.9  1.3 
China processing  4.7  3.3  8.0  53.8  1.7  0.0  1.7  1.2 1.0 1.2  9.3  2.8 
Indonesia   6.1  5.9  12.0  36.6  1.8  1.8  3.5  1.2 1.2 1.3  11.1  1.9 
Malaysia   3.5  2.1  5.6  46.3  1.6  2.9  4.4  1.3 1.5 1.8  6.7  3.2 
Philippines   3.8  3.3  7.1  42.2  1.5  1.3  2.7  1.2 1.2 1.4  7.8  2.3 
Thailand   5.2  4.2  9.4  45.8  1.7  4.6  6.3  1.2 1.5 1.7  10.5  2.5 
Vietnam   7.7  8.8  16.5  48.0  3.2  11.8  15.0  1.2 1.7 1.9  20.2  2.3 
Rest of East Asia  5.1  8.8  13.8  33.6  2.4  5.1  7.5  1.2 1.4 1.5  15.3  1.7 
India   5.2  6.7  11.8  20.4  1.0  3.2  4.2  1.1 1.3 1.4  10.0  1.5 
Rest of South Asia   6.0  6.6  12.6  26.0  1.9  3.9  5.8  1.2 1.3 1.5  10.7  1.6 
Other emerging economies    
Brazil   4.5  3.6  8.1  15.6  0.6  1.6  2.2  1.1 1.2 1.3  5.7  1.6 
EU accession  3.9  1.4  5.3  35.3  1.2  0.6  1.8  1.2 1.1 1.3  3.9  2.8 
Mexico processing  1.2  0.3  1.5  63.2  1.2  0.0  1.2  1.8 1.0 1.8  3.5  11.8 
Mexico normal  3.6  2.3  5.9  12.8  0.5  0.9  1.4  1.1 1.2 1.2  4.0  1.7 
Rest of America  4.6  5.9  10.5  23.0  1.3  2.3  3.6  1.1 1.2 1.4  9.2  1.6 
Russian federation  5.5  4.0  9.5  20.0  1.0  1.8  2.7  1.1 1.2 1.3  6.5  1.6 
South Africa   4.2  3.7  7.9  22.6  0.9  1.6  2.6  1.1 1.2 1.3  6.3  1.7 










a.(4) are also labeled as VS1* by Daudin et al (2011). 
b. (5) is labeled as VS, and (3) + (4) is labeled as VS1 by HIY (2001). 
c. (4) and (5) involve value added that crosses national borders at least twice, and are the sources 
of multiple counting of value added in standard trade statistics. 
d. The share of domestic content in a country's exports equals (1) + (2) + (3) + (4) 
 
e. (1) + (2) +(3) divided by gross exports is the VAX ratio for each country’s exports to the 




























































For online publication only 
Appendix A: Database construction and composition 
A.1 Processing trade in China and Mexico 
The WTO reports that about 20% of developing country exports come from Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs). Such processing regimes provide incentives to use imported 
intermediate inputs, provided that the resulting final goods are entirely exported. Processing 
trade can thus dramatically increase the imported content of exports relative to domestic use. 
Failure to account for processing imports can dramatically overstate the domestic content of 
exports (Koopman, Wang, and Wei, 2008). 
To reflect the reality and importance of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in emerging 
economies and their role in global value-added trade and production network, we incorporated an 
expandedChinese IO table with separate accounts for processing exports and a 2003 Mexican IO 
table with separate domestic and Maquiladora accounts.
1China and Mexico are the two largest 
users of export processing regimes in the developing world, and together account for about 85% 
of worldwide processing exports.
2We follow Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) to re-compute 
domestic and foreign value added in China and Mexico, but in a multi-country global setting, 
relaxing their assumption that all imports into China are 100% foreign value-added. 
 
A.2 Further comparison of end-use and proportional measures 
As shown in table A1, for most developing countries, the end-use method produces a 
lower intermediate share in exports. Developing countries (particularly Vietnam, China, South 
Asia, and Thailand) export substantially more final goods to their major export markets than 
what they supplied domestically. The exceptions are the natural-resource exporting countries 
such as Brazil andRussia—the end-use method produces higher intermediate shares in their 
exports. 
 
                                                 
1The Mexican table is from the Mexican statistical agencyInstitutoNacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática 
(INEGI). 
2During 2000-2008, China alone accounted for about 67% of all reported processing exports in the world while 
Mexico represents another 18% (Maurer and Degain, 2010). Similarly, based on IMF BOP statistics provided by 
Andreas Maurer, we estimate that China and Mexico together accounted for about 80% of goods for processing in 
the world in 2005 and 2007. 2 
 
 
Appendix Table A1 Share of intermediate inputs in trade, proportion and end-use methods 




Share of intermediates (%)  Value, billion 
U.S. dollars 
Share of intermediates (%) 
Proportion  End-use  Proportion  End-use 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Advanced economies 
Australia, New Zealand  122.5  71.7  69.4  131.5  56  50.2 
Canada  323.0  61  63.7  305.8  63  60.4 
EFTA  259.5  71.2  66.7  208.0  65.6  61.8 
Western EU  1,575.5  60.4  57.2  1,624.2  62.8  61.1 
Japan  618.9  60.4  56.7  513.9  64.2  61.9 
United States  1,062.3  61.4  63.2  1,590.1  57.2  54.7 
Asian NICs 
Hong Kong  121.7  63.4  62.6  104.8  61.3  60.5 
Korea  283.1  63.7  57.5  245.1  81.2  76.6 
Taiwan  219.8  67.9  68.4  170.3  75.4  72.6 
Emerging Asia 
China  670.6  54.6  43.1  568.8  82.6  77.4 
Malaysia  152.0  67.5  70.4  101.6  73.5  72.1 
Philippines  50.1  62  71.6  46.6  75.1  74.8 
Thailand  119.4  61.8  54.9  98.0  75.3  75.6 
Vietnam  32.3  55.8  42.7  34.5  72.9  72.1 
Indonesia  86.7  70.5  70.8  73.2  65.5  71 
Rest of East Asia  25.7  57.8  51.5  17.1  68.4  64.5 
India  99.9  59.2  63.5  121.1  75.8  81.9 
South Asia  36.0  47.1  36.5  51.3  56.2  60.6 
Other emerging economies 
Brazil  113.0  63.5  68.7  77.1  67.4  67.1 
EU accession countries  273.7  58.2  57.9  306.1  66.9  64 
Rest of Americas  209.3  69.9  71.9  183.1  55.8  55.7 
Mexico  190.5  55.7  52.4  183.4  63.1  74.6 
Russian Federation  160.2  82.8  88.8  121.3  46.4  42.3 
South Africa  61.4  71  71.5  54.1  65.1  61 
Rest of the world  715.9  79.2  81.1  647.0  49.6  51.2 
World  7,733.4  63.7  62.1  7,733.4  63.7  62.1 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on domestic supply in GTAP database and UN BEC end-use classification. 3 
 
 
A.3 Regional composition of the ICIO database 
As described in section 3, the ICIO database constructed for this paper includes 24 
additional countries or regions that, together with Mexico and China, covers all global trade and 
production. Table A2 lists the regions in the dataset along with the associated GTAP version 7 
countries and regions.   
 
Appendix Table A2 Countries in database and corresponding GTAP regions 
 
Country or region  Corresponding GTAP region(s) 
Australia, New Zealand  Australia, New Zealand 
Brazil  Brazil 
Canada  Canada 
China  China 
China normal  N/A 
China processing  N/A 
EFTA  Switzerland, Norway, Rest of EFTA 
EU accession  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
EU 15(Western EU)  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK 
Hong Kong  Hong Kong 
Indonesia  Indonesia 
India  India 
Japan  Japan 
Korea  Korea 
Mexico  Mexico 
Mexico normal  N/A 
Mexico processing  N/A 
Malaysia  Malaysia 
Philippines  Philippines 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Argentina, Bolivia, Caribbean, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Rest of Central America, Rest of North 
America, Rest of South America, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Rest of world  Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Botswana, Central Africa, Croatia, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Georgia, Iran, Islamic Republic of, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rest of Eastern Africa, Rest of 
E. Europe, Rest of Europe, Rest of Former Soviet Union, Rest of North Africa, Rest 
of Oceania, Rest of South African Customs Union, Rest of Western Africa, Rest of 
Western Asia, Senegal, South Central Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Russian Federation  Russian Federation 
Singapore  Singapore 
South Asia  Bangladesh, Pakistan, Rest of South Asia, Sri Lanka 
Thailand  Thailand 
Taiwan  Taiwan 
United States  United States 
Vietnam  Vietnam 
Rest of East Asia  Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Rest of East Asia, Rest of Southeast Asia 
South Africa  South Africa 
 4 
 
Appendix B.1 Differences in GVC participation across major regions in the world  
 
The gross export decomposition reported in Table 2 of the main text shows that there are 
major differences in the extent of economic integration across different regions of the world. 
Figure A1 graphically displays these differences. Among developing countries, emerging East 
Asia has some of the lowest domestic value-added shares in exports. For example, for each 
dollar of Chinese exports in 2004, Chinese factors contributed about 64.3 cents, of which 51.7 
cents was absorbed by China's direct importers, 11.9 cents was re-exported by those direct 
importers to third countries, and 0.8 cents returned to China.
3 Other East Asian countries have 
even lower shares of domestic content in their exports. South Asian countries, such as India, 
have higher shares of domestic content in their exports, indicating their lower integration into 
global supply chains (on average across all goods and services). Among all emerging markets, 
the natural resource exporters, such as Russia, have the highest domestic content shares in their 
exports.  
Most Asian developing countries (China, Vietnam, Thailand, South Asia, and the rest of 
East Asia), as well as Mexico and EU accession countries use substantial amounts of imported 
content to produce final goods exports, while most developed countries and natural resource 
exporters use imported value-added largely in the production of intermediate exports. 
Advanced economies generally have high shares of domestic content in their exports, 
although a large portion of such value may return home via imports.   The most notable feature 
of U.S. domestic value-added appears in column (5). It has, by far, the highest share of its own 
value-added returning home via imports (12.4% of its gross exports and 8.3% of its gross 
imports in 2004). We look into the source structure of returned domestic value added in some 
detail in next sub-section.  
Although Japan only has a moderate share of returned domestic value-added (2.9%), it is 
the most integrated major economy as a supplier of intermediate inputs to exporters in other 
countries. Column (4) presents indirect  value-added exports equal to IV in equation (24), 
excluding value added that has returned to home countries. (This is a cleaner measure of HIY’s 
original VS1 measure.) For Japan, 28% of its gross exports are indirect exported value-added to 
third countries. The high Japanese ranking on this measure is consistent with papers such as 
                                                 
3 This estimate is higher than initial estimates of Chinese value added in exports, but consistent with estimates based 
on the most recent Chinese IO table. For example, Koopman Wang and Wei (2008) estimated domestic value-added 
share of 54% using a 2002 China benchmark IO table. In contrast, Koopman, Wang and Wei (2011) uses the 
National Bureau of Statistics 2007 benchmark IO table—the same one employed in the current paper—to estimate 
that domestic value added composed 60.6% of Chinese gross exports.   5 
 
Dean, Lovely, and Mora (2009), which note that a high share of Japanese exports are processed 
in China and then sent as finished goods to developed countries such as the United States. This 
portion of value-added for the United States and Western EU
4 considerably lower (14.6% and 
13.5% respectively). 
Among emerging markets, natural resource exporters such as Russia and Indonesia 
export little of their domestic value added in final goods. These countries also tend to have high 
shares of domestic value-added absorbed by their direct importers, such as Russian exports of 
energy products absorbed by Europe, or Brazilian exports of primary products absorbed by the 
United States.  
Emerging East Asia stands out with very low domestic value added in intermediates that 
are absorbed by  their direct importers. Instead, these countries generally export substantial 
domestic value added in intermediate products that are subsequently re-exported to third 
countries. Although re-exports to third countries are generally the smallest of the four 
components of domestic content on average for the entire world, they represent much larger 
shares in East Asia and the so called Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). These East 
Asian economies are thus integrated into longer supply chains than other developing countries 
and are located in the middle of the production network, providing a large share of manufactured 
intermediates to both advanced and emerging economies. This result is consistent with single-
sector case studies that have examined Asian supply chains for products such as electronics and 
automobiles.
5 
Mexico and the EU accession countries appear most similar to East Asia economies 
among other emerging countries measured by their large share of foreign value-added in gross 
exports. They are distinguished from East Asia countries, however, by their large share of value-
added exports absorbed directly by their large immediate neighbors. Low income Asian 
countries (the rest of South and East Asian countries) as well as processing zones in China and 
Mexico have very high shares of value-added exports coming from direct exported final 
products, indicating that these economies are located in the end of global value chain.  
The three largest advanced economies (the US, Western EU and Japan) have a relatively 
high share of domestic value-added embodied in their direct final goods exports in addition to 
their high share of indirect value-added exports through third counties including that which 
                                                 
4 “Western EU” refers throughout to the first 15 members of the EU; “EU Accession countries” refers to the next 12 
members to join. 
5 For example, see Baldwin (2008) for disk drives and Nag et al. (2007) for automobiles. 6 
 
returns home, as we discussed earlier, indicating these economies are located in both upstream 
and downstream activities in the global production chain, consistent with the so called "smiling 
curve" phenomena found in the business economics literature.  
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Advanced economies 7 
 
 
B.2. Domestic value-added that returns home after processing abroad 
  Table A3 reports the share of domestic value-added that has returned from abroad in 
bilateral gross imports of final goods for each of the three major advanced economies from each 
of the listed source countries (in columns 2, 4, and 6). It also reports the weight that each source 
country contributes to the returned domestic value-added totals (in columns 3, 5, and 7). 
Each of these economies exhibits different patterns of production sharing in global supply 
chains. The United States contributes the highest share (10.0%) of its own value added to its 
imports of final goods. One-quarter of U.S. imports from Canada consist of value added from the 
United States itself, and a huge 40% of U.S. final good imports from Mexico consist of its own 
value added. These two countries account for three quarters of all U.S. value added returned 
from abroad. However, although the United States has the world’s highest share of its own value 
added return from abroad, it does so largely through North American regional supply chains.
6 
The EU contributes a lower share (7.8%) of value to its own final goods imports. This returning 
value, however, is less concentrated among trading partners. It received about 50% of such value 
from its European neighbors, and moderate shares of its own value from many more countries 
than the United States, with moderate returned value shares from much of Asia (over 5% from 
Vietnam, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia), and especially the “rest of the world” 
region (14.3%). Japan imports the lowest share of its own value, at 4.3%. The vast majority of its 
returned value comes from Asia, and China alone accounts for 58.5% of the total. Thus Japan, 
like the United States, largely receives its own value through regional supply chains, though 
through a more diverse set of partners. 
                                                 
6We also traced the returning value added one step further upstream for the United States, by computing the share of 
U.S. value added in other countries’ exports of intermediate inputs to Canada and Mexico (which then return to the 
United States).The results indicate that most U.S. inputs that return home after assembly and finishing in North 
America travel through very short supply chains. Over 96% of the returned U.S. value from Canada and Mexico was 
exported directly to those countries, so relatively a very small share of this value travels through third countries. 8 
 
 
Table A3 Sources of domestic value added that returns home via final goods imports 
 
  United States  Japan  EU 
Exporter 


















(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Advanced economies 
Australia, New Zealand  2.2  0.2  0.7  0.5  2.9  0.5 
Canada  24.7  32.4  0.7  0.2  3.3  0.6 
EFTA  3.0  0.4  0.9  0.5  19.6  18.1 
EU  2.1  4.4  0.9  3.9    0.0 
Japan  2.0  2.1    0.0  1.8  2.0 
USA    0.0  1.1  4.4  2.8  6.3 
Asian NICs 
Korea  5.4  2.2  5.1  4.7  4.3  2.3 
Hong Kong  3.1  0.6  4.3  3.0  5.6  1.0 
Taiwan  5.5  1.2  7.8  5.3  4.5  1.4 
Emerging Asia 
China  4.2  7.0  8.7  58.0  4.1  6.7 
Malaysia  7.5  1.5  8.0  3.5  8.0  1.4 
Indonesia  3.5  0.3  5.6  1.7  5.0  0.6 
Philippines  3.7  0.2  9.6  3.2  5.1  0.3 
Thailand  4.4  0.8  8.3  6.2  5.3  1.4 
Viet Nam  2.8  0.2  4.0  1.0  5.1  0.7 
Rest of East Asia  2.3  0.1  1.3  0.1  4.2  0.4 
India  1.5  0.2  0.5  0.0  3.8  1.0 
South Asia  1.9  0.2  1.0  0.1  3.5  0.7 
Other emerging economies 
Brazil  2.8  0.3  0.3  0.0  2.9  0.4 
EU accession countries  1.7  0.2  0.9  0.2  20.8  34.3 
Mexico  39.8  42.2  1.4  0.2  3.6  0.2 
Rest of America  6.3  1.9  0.5  0.2  3.2  1.2 
Russia  0.9  0.0  0.2  0.0  4.8  0.5 
South Africa  1.6  0.0  3.3  0.5  5.8  0.7 
Rest of the world  2.0  0.6  0.6  0.3  9.5  14.3 
World   10.0  100.0  4.3  100.0  7.8  100.0 
Comparison of export processing regimes 
China normal  1.6  0.8  1.4  3.3  2.4  1.8 
China processing  5.3  6.2  12.8  54.7  5.6  4.9 
Mexico normal  5.1  0.7  0.3  0.0  1.7  0.0 
Mexico processing  44.9  41.5  2.9  0.2  5.2  0.2 
 




B.3 Position of countries within value chains: Evidence from broad sectors 
The export decomposition of this paper reported the components of domestic and foreign 
value added in exports but did not examine the sector generating such value in each country 
(except the RCA example in section 4.1).  Appendix Table A4 breaks down three major value-
added components of gross exports into contributions by production factors employed in three 
broad sectors (raw materials, manufacturing, and services).
7Columns (2) through (4) present the 
value added to exports by these three broad sectors, as a share of total export value; while 
column (5) presents their sum, equal  to  the VAX ratio proposed by  Johnson and Noguera 
(2010).They highlight the two types of countries that have high value-added to gross exports 
ratios. First, countries that export much of their value added from their raw materials sectors 
have the highest VAX ratios (e.g., Russia and “rest of world”, which is dominated by petroleum 
exporters). Second, higher-income countries that export much of their value added from their 
services sectors, including Hong Kong, the EU, and the United States, also have relatively high 
overall VAX ratios, but lower than the natural resource exporters. Conversely, countries that 
export most of their value added from their manufacturing sectors, such as Taiwan, Mexico, and 
the Philippines, all have quite low VAX ratios.  
Table A4 also reports the broad sectoral composition of foreign value added used in gross 
exports in columns (6) through (9). The production factors employed in the manufacturing sector 
contribute most of foreign value added in every country’s gross exports. 
Table A4 also reports the sectors that provide value-added in exports that are indirectly 
exported through third countries in columns (10) through (14). At the global level, value-added 
generated by production factors employed in manufacturing sectors accounts for about one-half 
of exports that are sent indirectly through third countries, and value-added generated by 
production factors employed in raw materials account for another one-sixth. Countries with high 
indirect exports may be more susceptible to global shocks (Bems, Johnson, and Yi, 2010). This 
may be particularly true for those with high share of indirect value-added exports in 
manufacturing (e.g., the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea). These countries suffered major 
                                                 
7 The value-added measures are computed after partitioning the VBE matrix into the three broad sectors. Sector 
results include all value-added produced by factors of production employed in each of these broad sectors, and 
exported by all sectors in the economy. See section 2.2. for further discussion of sectoral disaggregation.  10 
 
production and export downturns in 2008, even though some of their major direct export 
destinations (such as China) were less affected by the global slowdown. 
Figure 2 in the main text shows whether countries are upstream and downstream in global 
supply chains for specific industries. For comparison to the literature, columns (14) through 
(17)present an alternative measure of each country's position in GVCs, the IV/FV ratio. These 
are analogous to the VS1/VS ratio presented by Daudin et al., 2010, though with additional detail 
on the domestic sector that provides value added to indirect exports.
8At the global level, IV and 
FV equal each other, therefore, the average IV/FV ratio is equal to 1. A ratio larger than 1 
indicates the country lies upstream in the global value-chain, either by providing raw materials 
(such as Russia) or by providing manufactured intermediates (such as Japan) or both.
9 These 
countries, plus Australia, the United States, and the EU, have the highest IV/FV ratios. A ratio 
less than one means the country lies downstream in the global value-chain, using more 
intermediate inputs from other countries to provide final goods. Column (14) in table A4 shows 
that two groups have low IV/FV ratios: (1) Asian economies (both emerging and NICs), and (2) 
free trade partners neighboring large developed economies. 
Further detail on the types of goods that countries provide to value chains allows us to 
separate these two types of countries. Columns (15) to (17) show that countries with higher than 
average IV/FV fall into one of two distinct groups. Some upstream emerging economies (e.g., 
Russia and Indonesia) produce primary products for global supply chains, while the upstream 
advanced economies produce both manufactured goods and services for these chains. (Almost 
uniformly, countries with high IV in manufacturing have high IV in services as well.) Only a few 




                                                 
8Columns (14) through (17) are calculated by dividing their respective column from (10) through (12) by column 
(9). 
9 Upstream here refers to the amount of value added provided relative to the amount received. Upstream in other 
literatures may denote the extent of primary product production. As we will see, some countries are upstream in both 
senses. 
10 Note that these three regions also have the lowest FV shares in column 9. 11 
 
Table A4 Decomposition of value-added exports from major sectors, share of gross exports, 2004 
Exporter 
Sector generating value-added exports
a 
Sector composition of foreign value-
added in exports
b 
Sector generating indirect value-added 
exports  through third countries





















(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17) 
Advanced economies 
Australia, New Zealand  30.3  21.1  36.5  88.0  3.6  5.6  2.3  11.5  9.8  8.7  9.4  27.9  2.4  0.86  0.76  0.82 
Canada   14.8  32.1  23.6  70.5  2.2  24.5  1.4  28.1  2.9  5.6  3.8  12.2  0.4  0.10  0.20  0.13 
EFTA  18.2  26.4  29.4  74.0  2.1  20.6  2.6  25.2  4.8  5.5  5.2  15.5  0.6  0.19  0.22  0.21 
EU  4.0  34.9  42.2  81.1  0.5  9.3  1.6  11.4  0.9  9.8  10.2  20.9  1.8  0.08  0.86  0.89 
Japan   1.1  49.9  34.0  84.9  0.1  11.6  0.6  12.2  0.3  18.8  11.7  30.8  2.5  0.03  1.53  0.96 
United States   5.5  32.4  36.7  74.6  0.6  10.7  1.7  12.9  1.7  13.9  11.4  27  2.1  0.13  1.07  0.88 
Asian NICs 
Korea   1.5  45.3  18.5  65.2  0.2  32.0  1.6  33.9  0.4  17.0  5.8  23.2  0.7  0.01  0.50  0.17 
Hong Kong   2.7  11.7  57.5  71.9  0.1  11.3  16  27.5  1.3  5.8  12.4  19.5  0.7  0.05  0.21  0.45 
Taiwan   0.9  37.0  20.2  58.2  0.4  39.7  1.0  41.1  0.2  18.7  8.2  27.1  0.7  0.01  0.46  0.20 
Emerging Asia 
China   9.3  37.5  16.0  62.8  1.0  33.8  0.8  35.7  1.6  7.6  3.0  12.2  0.3  0.05  0.21  0.08 
Indonesia   33.4  28.4  14.7  76.5  1.8  19.8  1.3  22.9  13.8  10.5  4.7  29  1.3  0.60  0.46  0.21 
Malaysia   13.0  32.2  13.4  58.6  2.3  36.2  1.9  40.5  4.5  15.7  4.9  25  0.6  0.11  0.39  0.12 
Philippines   6.4  38.5  12.8  57.8  1.2  38.8  1.8  41.9  1.6  21.8  5.9  29.4  0.7  0.04  0.52  0.14 
Thailand   10.9  31.0  18.1  60.0  2.5  34.3  2.9  39.7  2.2  11.4  4.9  18.5  0.5  0.06  0.29  0.12 
Vietnam   26.1  27.3  9.2  62.6  7.0  27.1  3.0  37.0  8.2  4.4  2.2  14.8  0.4  0.22  0.12  0.06 
Rest of East Asia  22.4  22.2  33.7  78.2  3.0  13.1  5.5  21.7  6.7  3.2  6.3  16.2  0.7  0.31  0.15  0.29 
India   17.2  35.2  27.2  79.6  1.0  16.5  2.6  20.1  4.3  8.9  5.8  18.9  0.9  0.21  0.44  0.29 
South Asia   14.0  30.8  33.8  78.6  1.3  18.0  2.1  21.3  1.8  3.8  5.0  10.7  0.5  0.09  0.18  0.24 
Other emergingeconomies 
Brazil   22.8  37.7  26.5  87.0  2.9  9.0  0.8  12.7  4.7  8.6  6.0  19.2  1.5  0.37  0.68  0.47 
EU accession countries  5.7  35.7  26.8  68.3  1.2  26.7  2.9  30.8  0.8  6.2  4.3  11.4  0.4  0.03  0.20  0.14 
Mexico   12.8  33.9  4.7  51.3  5.6  41.7  0.6  48.0  2.4  6.5  0.6  9.6  0.2  0.05  0.14  0.01 
Rest of Americas  34.8  24.2  25.9  84.9  4.5  7.6  2.3  14.4  8.0  7.7  5.5  21.2  1.5  0.55  0.53  0.38 
Russian Federation   37.4  23.0  28.7  89.1  2.8  6.4  1.0  10.2  13.2  8.9  9.1  31.2  3.1  1.30  0.87  0.90 
South Africa   13.0  31.2  37.4  81.6  3.3  13.1  1.8  18.2  3.4  11.8  9.0  24.2  1.3  0.19  0.65  0.50 
Rest of the world  44.5  16.3  22.2  83.0  5.1  7.7  1.8  14.6  15.6  4.3  5.0  24.9  1.7  1.07  0.29  0.34 
Average  12.4  32.6  29.4  74.4  1.6  18.0  1.9  21.5  3.6  10.3  7.6  21.5  1.0  0.17  0.48  0.35 
Source: Authors’ estimates.  
Note: Value-added exports equals box (1)+(2)+(3) in figure 1;Foreign value equals box (5); Indirect VA exports equals box  (3)+(4).12 
 
Table A5 Decomposition of gross exports, selected sectors for the 10 largest exporters, 2004  
 
Sector and exporter 
Gross 
exports 































    (1)  (2)
 a  (3)
 a  (4)
 a  (5)  (6)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Finished Mental Products                      
Western EU  35,743  17.5  47.6  13.0  10.7  11.1  100.0  23.8  88.9  21.9  34.9 
United States   17,766  12.9  34.2  13.1  29.0  10.8  100.0  42.0  89.2  39.8  52.8 
China Normal  17,457  23.6  46.5  13.0  0.8  16.0  100.0  13.8  84.0  16.8  29.8 
Japan  9,631  8.2  53.9  26.9  2.6  8.3  100.0  29.6  91.7  10.9  37.9 
Eastern EU  8,965  11.8  47.2  11.2  1.2  28.6  100.0  12.4  71.4  29.8  41.0 
Taiwan  7,602  15.7  36.1  14.6  0.2  33.3  100.0  14.8  66.7  33.5  48.1 
Canada  5,870  8.3  57.7  7.8  1.4  24.8  100.0  9.2  75.2  26.1  34.0 
China Processing  5,864  9.9  13.6  6.7  0.1  69.7  100.0  6.8  30.3  69.8  76.5 
EFTA  4,403  12.6  47.1  12.5  0.6  27.2  100.0  13.1  72.8  27.8  40.3 
Korea  4,202  12.1  43.0  19.1  0.5  25.3  100.0  19.6  74.7  25.8  44.9 
Motor Vehicles and parts                      
Western EU  148,265  58.0  17.7  6.0  5.6  12.7  100.0  11.6  87.3  18.3  24.3 
Japan  119,896  65.1  18.1  6.3  0.4  10.0  100.0  6.7  90.0  10.4  16.7 
United States   80,619  34.5  12.0  5.4  29.6  18.5  100.0  35.0  81.5  48.1  53.5 
Canada  64,730  37.2  10.8  1.2  0.5  50.3  100.0  1.7  49.7  50.8  52.0 
Eastern EU  37,352  26.7  25.0  5.9  0.8  41.7  100.0  6.6  58.3  42.5  48.3 
Korea  30,455  62.2  9.0  3.4  0.1  25.4  100.0  3.4  74.6  25.4  28.8 
Mexico processing  29,791  16.5  4.7  1.0  0.0  77.8  100.0  1.0  22.2  77.9  78.8 
Brazil  9,977  39.4  31.9  9.2  0.3  19.2  100.0  9.5  80.8  19.6  28.7 
China Processing  6,946  15.4  3.3  2.5  0.0  78.8  100.0  2.5  21.2  78.8  81.3 
Thailand  5,877  37.7  11.4  6.8  0.1  44.0  100.0  6.9  56.0  44.1  50.9 
Electronic Machinery                      
China Processing  161,070  28.4  8.0  6.5  0.0  57.1  100.0  6.5  42.9  57.1  63.6 
Japan  121,734  24.6  23.5  34.2  4.2  13.6  100.0  38.4  86.4  17.7  51.9 
United States   110,294  23.3  21.7  18.0  14.0  23.1  100.0  31.9  76.9  37.1  55.0 
Western EU  92,232  37.5  21.3  15.7  9.4  16.1  100.0  25.1  83.9  25.5  41.2 
Korea  91,101  21.8  13.3  22.4  0.8  41.8  100.0  23.1  58.2  42.5  64.9 
Taiwan  81,163  12.3  15.4  25.8  0.3  46.2  100.0  26.1  53.8  46.6  72.3 
Malaysia  74,746  15.9  14.6  19.3  0.4  49.8  100.0  19.7  50.2  50.2  69.5 
Singapore  53,458  5.7  5.3  7.8  0.1  81.1  100.0  7.9  18.9  81.2  89.0 
Mexico processing  31,042  39.8  19.5  10.9  0.1  29.8  100.0  10.9  70.2  29.8  40.7 
Philippines  30,204  9.5  17.5  25.7  0.2  47.1  100.0  25.9  52.9  47.3  73.0 
Note: Columns (1) through (11) are expressed as a share of total gross exports. Column numbering reflects table 2 in main 
text.   
a First order approximations 13 
 
 






































     (1)  (2)
 a  (3)
 a  (4)
 a  (5)  (6)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Meat and Dairy products                      
Western EU  13,477  75.0  13.5  2.1  1.2  8.2  100  3.3  91.8  9.4  11.6 
Australia & NZ  13,288  75.6  12.2  4.0  0.1  8.2  100  4.1  91.8  8.3  12.3 
USA  8,060  55.7  31.3  3.5  2.6  7.0  100  6.1  93.0  9.6  13.0 
Brazil  6,556  88.8  3.7  0.6  0.0  6.9  100  0.6  93.1  6.9  7.5 
Canada  4,363  70.8  12.8  2.0  0.1  14.3  100  2.0  85.7  14.4  16.3 
EU Accession  3,419  59.3  18.0  2.6  0.2  20.0  100  2.7  80.0  20.2  22.8 
China normal  1,291  77.9  7.9  3.8  0.6  9.9  100  4.3  90.1  10.5  14.2 
EFTA  954  54.5  15.8  2.7  0.1  26.9  100  2.8  73.1  27.0  29.8 
Thailand  910  78.4  2.9  1.2  0.0  17.6  100  1.2  82.4  17.6  18.7 
India  629  65.0  24.1  4.2  0.1  6.6  100  4.3  93.4  6.7  10.9 
Other Food Products                      
Western EU  29,390  62.0  22.7  4.1  2.5  8.7  100  6.6  91.3  11.2  15.3 
USA  19,365  52.7  28.5  5.9  5.5  7.5  100  11.4  92.5  13.0  18.9 
Brazil  10,052  30.8  49.3  10.1  0.1  9.8  100  10.2  90.2  9.9  20.0 
Canada  9,492  61.5  14.7  3.0  0.2  20.7  100  3.2  79.3  20.9  23.9 
China normal  8,928  81.9  3.5  1.6  0.1  13.0  100  1.7  87.1  13.1  14.6 
Malaysia  8,169  11.4  46.6  12.2  0.2  29.6  100  12.4  70.5  29.8  42.0 
Thailand  8,090  57.2  11.7  4.6  0.1  26.5  100  4.7  73.5  26.5  31.1 
Indonesia  7,321  27.3  46.6  12.8  0.3  13.1  100  13.1  86.9  13.4  26.2 
EFTA  6,938  59.5  7.7  2.0  0.1  30.7  100  2.1  69.3  30.8  32.8 
EU Accession  5,301  65.8  11.0  2.1  0.1  21.1  100  2.2  78.9  21.2  23.3 
Beverages and Tobacco                      
Western EU  19,654  81.8  7.6  1.9  0.9  7.9  100  2.8  92.1  8.8  10.7 
USA  4,644  81.6  6.4  1.5  3.5  7.1  100  5.0  93.0  10.6  12.1 
Australia & NZ  2,860  81.0  6.9  2.0  0.0  10.1  100  2.0  89.9  10.2  12.1 
Mexico processing  1,365  13.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  86.7  100  0.0  13.3  86.7  86.7 
Canada  1,315  67.6  15.0  3.5  0.1  13.9  100  3.6  86.1  14.0  17.4 
EU Accession  1,204  68.0  8.5  2.2  0.1  21.2  100  2.3  78.8  21.3  23.5 
South Africa  1,143  78.3  7.5  2.2  0.0  11.9  100  2.3  88.1  11.9  14.2 
Singapore  834  53.0  0.7  0.3  0.0  46.0  100  0.4  54.0  46.1  46.4 
China normal  804  84.1  6.7  1.5  0.1  7.6  100  1.6  92.4  7.7  9.2 
Mexico normal  794  95.9  1.1  0.4  0.0  2.6  100  0.4  97.4  2.6  3.0 14 
 






































     (2)
 a  (3)
 a  (4)
 a  (5)  (6)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (1) 
Textiles                      
Western EU  34,819  19.7  37.6  14.1  16.9  11.8  100  30.9  88.2  28.7  42.7 
China normal  34,804  45.4  21.9  15.9  0.5  16.3  100  16.4  83.7  16.8  32.7 
USA  15,052  13.9  31.9  10.5  31.8  11.9  100  42.3  88.1  43.7  54.3 
Korea  12,987  7.7  27.0  33.2  0.8  31.3  100  34.0  68.7  32.1  65.3 
Taiwan  12,651  5.4  22.2  38.1  0.4  34.0  100  38.4  66.0  34.4  72.4 
China processing  9,595  6.9  10.5  6.8  0.0  75.8  100  6.9  24.3  75.8  82.6 
India  9,394  42.9  25.6  16.0  0.2  15.2  100  16.2  84.8  15.4  31.4 
Japan  7,672  2.3  25.2  41.0  10.9  20.6  100  51.9  79.4  31.5  72.5 
EU Accession  7,659  33.2  27.2  6.3  0.8  32.5  100  7.1  67.5  33.3  39.6 
Hong Kong  5,532  23.6  4.8  39.0  3.2  29.4  100  42.2  70.6  32.7  71.7 
Wearing Apparel                      
China normal  32,985  87.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  12.1  100  0.0  87.9  12.1  12.1 
Western EU  17,338  84.5  3.5  2.3  0.9  8.8  100  3.2  91.2  9.7  12.0 
China processing  14,144  43.5  0.9  1.0  0.0  54.6  100  1.0  45.4  54.6  55.6 
EU Accession  10,811  67.9  0.9  0.2  0.0  30.9  100  0.3  69.1  31.0  31.2 
Hong Kong  9,624  30.7  2.2  26.3  1.3  39.5  100  27.6  60.5  40.8  67.1 
India  6,122  83.5  0.6  0.2  0.0  15.8  100  0.2  84.2  15.8  16.0 
Mexico processing  5,259  12.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  87.7  100  0.0  12.3  87.7  87.7 
Vietnam  4,032  49.7  0.4  0.2  0.0  49.7  100  0.2  50.3  49.7  49.9 
Indonesia  3,980  64.4  0.9  0.4  0.0  34.3  100  0.4  65.7  34.3  34.7 
USA  3,633  64.7  1.8  2.4  19.7  11.5  100  22.1  88.5  31.2  33.6 
Leather Products                      
China normal  16,370  87.8  1.1  1.2  0.0  10.0  100  1.2  90.1  10.0  11.1 
China processing  15,920  60.5  2.1  2.2  0.0  35.2  100  2.2  64.8  35.2  37.4 
Western EU  15,446  57.4  17.3  8.1  6.9  10.3  100  15.0  89.7  17.2  25.3 
Vietnam  5,398  48.3  1.0  0.3  0.0  50.3  100  0.3  49.7  50.3  50.6 
EU Accession  4,078  63.4  6.3  1.7  0.2  28.5  100  1.8  71.5  28.7  30.3 
Brazil  3,553  44.5  26.1  15.5  0.1  13.8  100  15.5  86.2  13.9  29.4 
USA  2,621  29.7  16.6  9.7  30.9  13.1  100  40.6  86.9  44.0  53.7 
India  2,491  60.2  13.8  9.7  0.1  16.3  100  9.7  83.7  16.4  26.0 
Indonesia  2,185  74.8  4.9  4.2  0.1  16.1  100  4.3  83.9  16.2  20.4 










































     (1)  (2)
 a  (3)
 a  (4)
 a  (5)  (6)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Wood Products                      
Canada  21,802  12.9  62.3  3.8  1.1  19.9  100  4.9  80.1  21.0  24.8 
Western EU  21,083  27.1  46.5  8.0  7.0  11.5  100  14.9  88.5  18.5  26.5 
EU Accession  15,072  32.3  37.8  6.0  0.5  23.4  100  6.5  76.6  23.9  29.9 
China normal  11,936  43.3  39.1  8.8  0.3  8.4  100  9.1  91.6  8.7  17.5 
USA  8,630  9.9  49.2  7.7  21.8  11.5  100  29.5  88.5  33.3  41.0 
China processing  7,080  17.6  10.1  2.3  0.0  70.0  100  2.3  30.0  70.0  72.3 
Indonesia  5,734  21.0  50.7  16.0  0.2  12.1  100  16.2  87.9  12.3  28.3 
Malaysia  5,529  17.3  44.7  13.3  0.1  24.6  100  13.4  75.4  24.7  38.0 
Brazil  4,084  16.4  66.0  9.4  0.1  8.0  100  9.5  92.0  8.1  17.5 
Mexico processing  3,549  52.1  8.2  1.0  0.0  38.7  100  1.0  61.3  38.7  39.7 
 Paper Products & Publishing                    
Western EU  34,830  18.0  53.5  12.3  8.5  7.7  100  20.8  92.3  16.2  28.5 
USA  22,573  18.7  48.5  10.9  13.5  8.4  100  24.4  91.7  21.9  32.8 
Canada  19,186  7.1  63.0  10.0  1.1  18.8  100  11.1  81.2  19.9  29.9 
EU Accession  5,529  20.0  45.7  8.9  0.8  24.7  100  9.7  75.4  25.4  34.3 
EFTA  4,385  9.5  63.9  11.3  0.7  14.7  100  12.0  85.4  15.4  26.7 
Indonesia  3,921  7.2  43.2  23.6  0.3  25.6  100  23.9  74.4  25.9  49.5 
Japan  3,832  10.3  48.7  28.7  3.7  8.7  100  32.4  91.4  12.4  41.1 
Brazil  3,652  2.6  68.7  17.0  0.3  11.5  100  17.3  88.6  11.7  28.7 
Korea  2,718  8.4  42.2  26.3  0.7  22.5  100  27.0  77.6  23.1  49.5 
China processing  2,486  9.7  9.4  3.1  0.0  77.8  100  3.1  22.3  77.8  80.9 
Petroleum & Coal Production                    
Western EU  21,150  0.0  31.3  7.0  4.3  57.4  100  11.3  42.6  61.7  68.7 
USA  16,761  0.0  33.7  8.6  5.0  52.7  100  13.6  47.4  57.6  66.3 
Russia  12,619  0.0  70.3  22.1  0.5  7.0  100  22.7  93.0  7.6  29.7 
Singapore  9,172  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  100.2  100  -0.1  -0.2  100.2  100.1 
China normal  6,458  0.0  48.3  16.8  1.1  33.8  100  17.9  66.2  34.9  51.7 
Korea  6,336  0.0  31.9  12.8  0.6  54.8  100  13.3  45.2  55.3  68.1 
Canada  5,165  0.0  57.0  10.2  1.4  31.4  100  11.6  68.6  32.8  43.0 
EU Accession  3,962  0.0  38.8  11.4  0.6  49.2  100  12.0  50.8  49.8  61.2 
India  3,573  0.0  28.9  11.4  0.3  59.4  100  11.7  40.6  59.7  71.2 
EFTA  3,034  0.0  62.6  13.8  0.8  22.9  100  14.5  77.1  23.7  37.4 16 
 
 






































     (1)  (2)
 a  (3)
 a  (4)
 a  (5)  (6)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Chemical, Rubber & Plastic Products                    
Western EU  226,573  25.3  39.6  14.4  9.0  11.7  100  23.5  88.4  20.7  35.1 
USA  145,203  13.2  41.9  15.9  14.6  14.5  100  30.5  85.6  29.0  44.9 
Japan  69,500  10.3  38.9  31.8  3.6  15.5  100  35.3  84.6  19.0  50.8 
EFTA  41,337  21.7  30.7  9.7  0.4  37.6  100  10.1  62.5  38.0  47.6 
Korea  30,847  4.0  31.6  26.7  0.7  37.0  100  27.4  63.0  37.7  64.4 
Canada  29,018  12.9  46.0  10.9  1.4  28.9  100  12.3  71.1  30.2  41.2 
Taiwan  28,696  8.4  20.3  25.6  0.3  45.5  100  25.8  54.5  45.8  71.4 
China normal  28,340  22.7  36.4  18.6  1.4  20.9  100  20.0  79.2  22.3  40.9 
Singapore  24,500  3.2  24.4  17.7  0.3  54.4  100  18.0  45.6  54.7  72.4 
EU Accession  21,001  14.2  43.0  13.1  1.1  28.6  100  14.2  71.4  29.7  42.8 
Mineral Products                      
Western EU  21,034  12.5  61.5  9.5  6.4  10.1  100  15.9  89.9  16.6  26.0 
China normal  8,907  32.9  42.3  10.3  0.8  13.6  100  11.1  86.4  14.5  24.8 
USA  7,068  3.7  53.7  12.1  22.0  8.6  100  34.1  91.5  30.5  42.6 
Japan  6,256  3.2  53.6  31.1  3.6  8.5  100  34.7  91.5  12.1  43.2 
EU Accession  4,628  16.4  52.4  6.5  0.6  24.1  100  7.1  75.9  24.7  31.2 
Canada  2,282  0.6  72.0  7.3  1.3  18.9  100  8.5  81.1  20.2  27.4 
Brazil  1,797  3.8  73.7  11.4  0.2  10.9  100  11.6  89.1  11.1  22.5 
China processing  1,683  10.4  8.7  4.6  0.1  76.2  100  4.6  23.8  76.3  80.9 
Thailand  1,548  14.6  42.8  12.2  0.2  30.3  100  12.4  69.8  30.4  42.6 
Taiwan  1,526  5.8  43.5  22.3  0.3  28.1  100  22.6  71.9  28.4  50.7 
Ferrous Metals                      
Western EU  30,940  0.0  51.2  21.3  13.7  13.8  100  35.1  86.2  27.5  48.9 
Japan  20,203  0.0  43.6  38.3  3.9  14.2  100  42.3  85.8  18.1  56.5 
Russia  15,843  0.0  53.8  32.4  0.9  12.9  100  33.3  87.1  13.8  46.2 
USA  10,327  0.0  41.8  17.8  27.8  12.6  100  45.6  87.4  40.4  58.2 
China normal  10,185  0.0  48.0  31.8  3.3  16.9  100  35.1  83.1  20.2  52.0 
Korea  9,672  0.0  37.9  26.1  0.8  35.2  100  26.8  64.8  36.0  62.1 
EU Accession  8,848  0.0  49.8  18.5  1.5  30.2  100  20.0  69.9  31.6  50.2 
Taiwan  6,556  0.0  29.7  27.3  0.4  42.6  100  27.7  57.4  43.1  70.3 
Brazil  6,523  0.0  59.1  26.7  0.4  13.9  100  27.1  86.2  14.2  40.9 
South Africa  5,921  0.0  54.2  29.2  0.2  16.3  100  29.5  83.7  16.6  45.8 17 
 
 






































     (1)  (2)
 a  (3)
 a  (4)
 a  (5)  (6)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Non-ferrous Metals                      
Western EU  20,457  1.4  41.6  25.4  15.3  16.3  100  40.7  83.7  31.6  57.0 
EFTA  19,549  0.0  36.6  17.8  0.6  45.1  100  18.3  54.9  45.7  63.4 
Canada  16,990  0.0  47.2  18.3  1.9  32.6  100  20.2  67.4  34.5  52.8 
USA  16,283  0.3  32.7  27.7  21.7  17.7  100  49.3  82.3  39.4  67.0 
Australia & NZ  15,551  0.0  43.5  42.7  1.0  12.7  100  43.7  87.3  13.8  56.5 
Russia  15,419  0.0  55.9  31.9  0.6  11.6  100  32.5  88.4  12.2  44.1 
South Africa  9,486  0.0  49.4  34.6  0.2  15.8  100  34.8  84.3  16.0  50.6 
Japan  8,612  0.0  25.4  42.5  4.9  27.1  100  47.4  72.9  32.0  74.6 
Korea  5,553  0.0  15.0  23.9  0.9  60.2  100  24.8  39.8  61.1  85.0 
China normal  5,501  1.5  40.8  34.7  3.0  20.0  100  37.7  80.0  23.0  57.7 
Transportation Equipment                      
USA  63,850  41.8  28.4  10.7  4.9  14.2  100  15.6  85.8  19.1  29.8 
Western EU  50,704  54.6  19.2  7.8  4.2  14.3  100  12.0  85.8  18.4  26.3 
Japan  16,881  60.3  17.0  7.0  0.6  15.2  100  7.5  84.8  15.8  22.7 
Korea  12,858  67.6  2.1  0.8  0.0  29.5  100  0.9  70.5  29.6  30.4 
Canada  11,687  36.5  19.3  7.5  0.4  36.4  100  7.8  63.6  36.7  44.2 
China processing  5,898  28.0  8.5  6.3  0.0  57.2  100  6.3  42.8  57.2  63.5 
EU Accession  5,710  52.2  12.2  4.5  0.2  30.9  100  4.7  69.1  31.1  35.6 
China normal  4,961  38.5  31.5  16.1  0.6  13.2  100  16.7  86.8  13.9  29.9 
Brazil  4,901  79.9  5.4  2.2  0.0  12.5  100  2.2  87.5  12.6  14.8 
EFTA  4,189  56.0  13.0  4.4  0.2  26.4  100  4.6  73.6  26.6  31.0 
Machinery and Equipment                      
Western EU  309,383  52.7  21.8  7.9  5.4  12.4  100  13.2  87.7  17.7  25.6 
USA  183,179  51.1  20.7  8.8  8.8  10.6  100  17.6  89.4  19.4  28.2 
Japan  162,999  52.2  19.6  15.0  1.7  11.6  100  16.7  88.5  13.2  28.2 
China processing  54,400  25.9  13.3  12.1  0.4  48.3  100  12.5  51.7  48.7  60.8 
EFTA  47,748  40.2  14.4  5.2  0.2  40.1  100  5.3  59.9  40.2  45.4 
China normal  44,087  39.0  30.4  14.3  1.2  15.1  100  15.5  84.9  16.3  30.6 
Korea  43,488  52.4  12.1  9.1  0.3  26.1  100  9.4  73.9  26.4  35.5 
Taiwan  42,724  39.6  10.7  9.1  0.2  40.5  100  9.2  59.5  40.6  49.7 
EU Accession  41,086  26.9  30.6  8.1  0.8  33.6  100  8.9  66.4  34.4  42.5 
Mexico processing  34,979  10.5  8.8  3.0  0.1  77.7  100  3.1  22.3  77.7  80.8 18 
 
 






































     (1)  (2)
 a  (3)
 a  (4)
 a  (5)  (6)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Other Manufactures                      
Western EU  28,178  61.0  19.9  4.7  3.2  11.2  100  7.8  88.8  14.4  19.1 
China processing  20,916  62.4  4.0  1.4  0.0  32.3  100  1.4  67.7  32.3  33.7 
USA  16,796  57.9  17.1  5.4  5.2  14.4  100  10.6  85.6  19.6  25.0 
China normal  14,326  86.3  3.9  1.3  0.0  8.4  100  1.4  91.6  8.5  9.8 
India  14,220  26.7  35.5  13.8  0.3  23.8  100  14.0  76.2  24.1  37.8 
Japan  6,996  59.1  19.1  9.8  1.0  11.1  100  10.8  88.9  12.1  21.9 
EFTA  5,645  43.2  14.4  3.6  0.2  38.7  100  3.7  61.3  38.9  42.4 
Thailand  4,098  46.9  11.8  4.5  0.0  36.8  100  4.5  63.3  36.8  41.3 
Taiwan  3,194  52.6  8.3  7.4  0.1  31.6  100  7.5  68.4  31.7  39.1 
Malaysia  2,854  49.3  3.5  2.1  0.0  45.0  100  2.1  55.0  45.1  47.2 
 
Note: Columns (1) through (11) are expressed as a share of total gross exports. Column numbering reflects table 2 in main 
text.   




Table A6 Magnification of trade costs on final manufacturing goods exports from vertical 
specialization, 2004 -- Descriptive Statistics for detailed sector level results 
 
  Standard trade costs   Foreign 
content 
share 
Trade cost for imported 
inputs  
Magnification factor










Trans-  Tariff  Total  Trans-  Tariff  Total  Trans-  Tariff  Total 
port  (1)+(2)  port  (5)+(6)  port 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (1)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
N  445  445  445  445  445  445  445  445  445  445  445  445  439 
MIN  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.0  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.2  0.0  1.1 
MAX  22.3  20.3  31.3  90.9  9.4  20.4  22.7  171.4  85.4  255.8  97.0  172.1  281.0 
MEAN  6.1  4.4  10.5  30.7  1.7  1.9  3.6  1.7  1.5  2.1  69.3  10.3  4.5 
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